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Abstract 
This dissertation considers the impact of the emerging security regime enshrined in 
the ISPS Code and the relevant amendments to SOLAS Convention, 1974 on the 
doctrine of seaworthiness. The momentary aspect of seaworthiness is reflected in 
case law, through the position taken by the courts when dealing with claims 
involving allegations of unseaworthiness and lack of due diligence.  
 
While relevance of the ISM Code to the assessment of seaworthiness of a ship is 
demonstrated, the undertaking of seaworthiness upon the company as defined in the 
ISPS Code is analyzed with respect to security requirements. As there has yet to be 
any ISPS Code related cases, the absolute obligation of seaworthiness according to 
the English law, is dealt with through a hypothetical scenario. 
 
The concept of due diligence within the security regime is discussed with reference 
to the development of the Ship Security Plan (SSP). The relevance of the port facility 
to the equation of seaworthiness is also considered. Other issues considered are the 
limitation of liability and the relevance of soft law to seaworthiness. 
 
As the breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness may lead to loss of cover, the 
implications of the security regime are discussed. Pending harmonization of the law 
in marine insurance law, reference is made respectively to Marine Insurance Act 
1906 and to the continental Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996. A few 
recommendations are made to assist companies in fulfilling their undertaking of 
seaworthiness.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Paragraph 8 of the preamble of the International Code for the Security of Ships and of 
Port Facilities (ISPS) Code, which entered into force in July 2004 requires for the 
implementation of the provisions of the Code an effective co-operation and 
understanding between all those involved with or using ships and port facilities. 
Nevertheless, since the inception of the security regime enshrined in the ISPS Code 
and the relevant amendments to SOLAS Convention 1974, the different operators 
within the sphere of shipping have expressed their concerns about the various 
implications that may arise out of the implementation of such a regime. Undoubtedly, 
the scope of these implications is likely to cover a variety of shipping related activities 
such as chartering and marine insurance. 
 
With respect to chartering practices, it is of paramount importance to explore the 
interaction of the main ingredients of charter parties such as seaworthiness, laytime and 
safety of port with the present security constraints, characterized by potential delays or 
even denial from entry into ports. Such situations may trigger disputes between the 
owner and the charterer, in terms of allocation of the additional costs resulting in 
particular from the non-compliance with the requirements of the security regime, such 
as with the obligation of holding a valid International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC). 
 
In addition, consideration should be given to ensuring the rights of third parties such as 
the cargo owners. In fact, non-compliance with the requirements of the ISPS Code may 
lead to potential delays of the ship in ports. This occurrence may cause damage to the 
cargo, especially if consisting of perishable goods, as well as loss of market. It could 
1 
be argued that the cargo owner may invoke the undertaking of seaworthiness upon the 
carrier in an attempt to hold the latter liable for any extra sustained expenses. However, 
it should be noted that the doctrine of seaworthiness as established over the history of 
maritime law has been mainly interpreted by the courts, in referring to the 
requirements pertaining to safety of navigation during the intended adventure.  
 
Despite the fact that the literature review related to chartering practices reveals that the 
security element has been taken in some instances into consideration, in particular 
when construing the concept of ´safe port´ as has been reflected through the case of 
“Evaggelos Th.”, 1 the security requirements onboard a ship have never been expressly 
qualified by the courts as among the vital ingredients that should be referred to when 
assessing the status of seaworthiness. 
 
In view of the challenges imposed by the new security regime, lawyers and legal 
scholars dealing with matters pertaining to the carriage of goods by sea have to review 
the scope of the doctrine of seaworthiness in order to find out whether there is within 
the body of maritime law room for extending the meaning of seaworthiness of a ship to 
include the security aspect. Having said that, it is a fact that the operators of the 
industry, including owners, charterers or cargo owners have always agreed by 
negotiation on the rights and duties of each party through the contractual arrangements 
performed. In other words, the market has most of the time imposed on the parties self-
regulatory mechanisms, when it comes to the allocation of extra costs incurred as a 
result of the implementation of new shipping regulations. In this respect, the BIMCO 
ISM clause for voyage and time charter parties2 is a practical example, which reflects 
the self-regulatory force of the market. 
 
                                                 
1 See Vardinoyannis v. The Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation [ 1971] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 200 
2 See BIMCO, ´ISM Clause´ (1998)  
< http://www.bimco.dk/Corporate%20Area/Documents/Clauses/ISM%20CLAUSE.aspx> (24 August 
2005) 
2 
Aside from its substantial relevance to charter parties and bills of lading, the 
undertaking of seaworthiness is one of the vital ingredients of the law of marine 
insurance. In fact, whatever the applicable law on the subject matter, the undertaking 
of seaworthiness may be used by the insurer as a valuable defence to be exonerated 
from liability. There is no doubt that, in view of the potential delays or denial from 
entry to ports resulting from the implementation of the security regime, it might 
reasonably be expected from the insurance industry to set additional insurance 
premiums to cover the new risks incurred. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that 
prior to the entry into force of the ISPS Code, some Club insurers such as the UK P& I 
Club have adapted its relevant rules, in order to take into account the requirements of 
the Code. 3 However, emphasis needs to be particularly placed on the determination of 
the nature of the undertaking of seaworthiness. 
  
1.2  Objectives 
 
The implications of the security regime on maritime law principles are likely to cover 
various legal concepts. Particularly, the ambit of this dissertation is to determine the 
impact of the ISPS Code and the relevant amendments to SOLAS Convention, 1974 on 
the interpretation of the doctrine of seaworthiness. In this context, the following 
objectives have to be achieved: 
 
• To provide a literature review of the doctrine of seaworthiness; 
• To determine what is a seaworthy ship under the security regime;  
• To identify the implications of the security regime on some issues related to 
seaworthiness such as limitation of liability;   
                                                 
3 See ´ Selected Legal Implications of The ISPS Code´  (2003) 3 BBL Newsletter 
< http://www.bbl-law.com/doc/BBL-Newsletter2003-03%20deutsche%20Version.pdf>  
(20 August 2005), where Rule 5(K) now reads: ´´ The owner must…at all times maintain the validity of 
such statutory certificates as are issued by or an behalf of the state of the state of the ship´s flag in 
relation to such requirements and in relation to the ISM Code and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code´´.  
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• To determine the manner in which the undertaking of seaworthiness may be 
interpreted by the law of marine insurance under the realm of security, with 
reference to the relevant English and Norwegian laws. 
 
With respect to the scope of this dissertation, the following considerations are to be 
taken into account: 
 
• The seaworthiness doctrine is to be thoroughly discussed with respect to the 
concept of due diligence as prescribed by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules;  
• As the core of this dissertation is based on the concept of due diligence in 
providing a seaworthy ship, it is sufficient for the purpose of the discussion to 
make primarily reference to the provisions of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.     
• The implications of unseaworthiness are mainly examined with regard to the 
relationship between the disponent owner and the cargo owner; 
• Since there have yet to be any ISPS Code related cases, the principle of analogy 
is used in the discussion of seaworthiness under the security regime, supported 
by a set of hypothetical scenarios;  
• The questionnaire carried out for the sake of this dissertation is based on a 
random sampling method. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The methodology adopted in Chapter 2 
is to trace through a review of case law, the manner in which the doctrine of 
seaworthiness has been interpreted by the courts within the Anglo-American arena. 
The nature and the effects of the breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness are 
discussed in the context of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and 
with respect to the advent of the ISM Code. Also, a general overview of the 
undertaking of seaworthiness under the law of marine insurance is undertaken. 
 
4 
In chapter 3, the features of the absolute obligation of seaworthiness as well as the due 
diligence concept in respect of seaworthiness are examined, with reference to the the 
main requirements of the ISPS Code. The liability of the Recognized Security 
Organisations is highlighted. Due to the dual aspect of the Code, the role of the port 
facility in the equation of seaworthiness is discussed. Further, issues related to the 
breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness such as limitation of liability is dealt with. 
Finally, the relevance of soft law to seaworthiness is discussed. 
 
In chapter 4, the undertaking of seaworthiness in the context of the security regulations 
is elucidated with reference respectively to the relevant English and Norwegian laws. 
This chapter sheds light on the principles of conflict of laws, which should be taken 
into account in the interpretation of the doctrine of seaworthiness. 
 
In Chapter 5, conclusions are drawn from the discussions undertaken in chapters 2, 3 
and 4. A few recommendations are made in order to assist the shipping companies in 
fulfilling their undertaking of seaworthiness, either in terms of the duty of due 
diligence as per the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules or in terms of their obligations under an 
insurance policy.   
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CHAPTER 2 
SEAWORTHINESS IN GENERAL 
 
   
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
At the outset, it should be remembered that the present dissertation aims to define first 
what is a seaworthy ship under the security regime, enshrined in the ISPS Code and the 
relevant amendments to the Convention of Safety of Life at Sea 1974 and thereby 
determine the potential legal implications of non-compliance of the ship with the security 
provisions on the performance of some contractual arrangements such as charter parties. 
Before undertaking a foray into the core part of the subject matter, it is worth tracing in 
this chapter the way the concept of seaworthiness has been interpreted by the courts in 
the context of charter parties, especially within the framework of the relevant 
international legal instruments, such as the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg 
Rules and IMO regulations, such as the ISM Code.  
 
Also, it should be pointed out that a part of this chapter will de devoted to discussion 
about the nature and the extent of the warranty of seaworthiness established under an 
insurance policy. In this respect, an illustration of the different approaches followed 
respectively by the common law and the civil law jurisdictions with regard to marine 
insurance will be carried out. 
 
2.2 Absolute obligation of seaworthiness 
 
In the context of a charter party, seaworthiness is a standard to which the condition of a 
ship has to be measured, particularly, before the beginning of a voyage in a voyage 
charter in case of incorporation of the Hague/Hague Visby Rules through a paramount 
clause and at the time of delivery of the vessel to a time charterer. In this respect, it is 
essential to mention two important features that characterize the concept of 
6 
seaworthiness. Firstly, it is not absolute, as it depends on the nature of the ship, the 
particular voyage contracted and the particular cargo carried.4 Secondly, the duty of the 
owner5 to provide a seaworthy vessel may vary from an absolute implied or express 
obligation to solely a due diligence to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship. In this 
section, a look will be made into the development of the notion of an absolute obligation 
of seaworthiness, which is mainly a common law principle, with making a reference to 
the way the concept has been conceived in some civil law countries. 
 
 2.2.1 Implied obligation of seaworthiness 
 
In common law, the owner or the disponent owner,6 as the case may be, has an absolute 
undertaking to provide the charterer with a seaworthy ship.7 This obligation may be 
implied8 in the absence of express clauses in the charter party stipulating so. However, it 
has been established through a set of maritime cases that the implied undertaking of 
seaworthiness has been mainly interpreted in English law in the technical sense, with 
regard to its fitness to encounter the perils of the intended voyage and its ability to 
receive the type of cargo provided by the shipper or what have been respectively referred 
to as seaworthiness pure and simple and cargo worthiness.9 
 
It should be borne in mind that this kind of undertaking does not release the owner from 
his responsibilities regarding seaworthiness even in the case of detection of deficiencies 
that were not discovered in the first place trough a diligent inspection of the ship. It 
should be stressed that the Anglo-American courts have been reluctant to construe the 
concept of the implied seaworthiness in a broad manner, whereas the attitude has been 
rather different, when it comes to the interpretation of express terms of seaworthiness 
                                                 
4 See Scrutton, Thomas E et al, Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading,19th  ed (London :  
    Sweet& Maxwell, 1984), 83    
5 Or generally the disponent owner 
6 In case of a vessel chartered by a time charterer. 
7 See Hill, Christopher, Maritime Law, 6th ed (London, Hong Kong : LLP, 2003), 172       
8 See Giertsen v. Turnbull (1908) S.C.1101 
9 See Chorley, Robert S et al, Chorley & Giles´Shipping Law, 8th ed (London : Financial  
  Times/Pitman Publishing, 1987), 187-188  
7 
mentioned in the charter parties. Further, a look will be taken at a number of cases 
reflecting the extensive scope granted by the Anglo-American courts to the doctrine of 
seaworthiness. 
 
2.2.2 Express obligation of seaworthiness 
 
It is worth mentioning that commonly used standard voyage or time charter party forms 
encompass express terms, placing an absolute obligation on the owner to provide a 
seaworthy ship in the port of loading in case of a voyage charter party or on delivery 
when dealing with a time charter party. This section will be dealt with in the context of 
absence of incorporation of any international or national legal instruments such as the 
Hague/Hague Visby Rules in the charter party through a paramount clause. The present 
discussion aims to shed light on the interpretation of some standard clauses of 
seaworthiness, with reference to numerous Anglo-American cases.  
 
It could be mentioned that the words ´ being tight, staunch and in every way fit for the 
voyage´10 and ´ in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service´11  are among the standard 
terms commonly used in charter parties to express the obligation of the owner to provide 
a seaworthy ship. Although their literal meaning may refer solely to the physical 
condition of the vessel, they have been subject to a wider interpretation by the Anglo-
American courts, as has been demonstrated trough case law, such as in “The 
Madeleine”,12 “The Hongkong Fir”13 and “The Augvald”.14  
The “Madeleine” was chartered on a Baltime form, which required the vessel in respect 
of clause 1 to be ´ in every way fitted for ordinary cargo service´.  The court held that the 
obligation of seaworthiness was breached by the owners due to the lack of the certificate 
of deratisation, necessary for the ship to sail outside India. The inability of the owners to 
                                                 
10 NORGRAIN 89. 
11 See Baltime form, clause 1 and NYPE 93, clause 2. 
12 Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury & Ors v. Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 224   
    QBD (Comm.Ct) 
13 Hongkong Fir Shipping Company Ltd v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.159 and  
    [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.478 (C.A) 
14 Unimar Seatransport GmbH v. Orient Mid-East Lines Inc. [1965] AMC 1614 ArbNY 
8 
provide this document within a reasonable time had entitled the charterers to cancel the 
charter party. It should be stressed that the lack of the document of deratisation in this 
case has been instrumental for the performance of the contemplated trading of the vessel, 
which amounted to its unseaworthiness. However, the nature of the documents 
pertaining to the seaworthiness of the vessel depends on the requirements of the law of 
the flag state or of those enforced by the authorities exercising administrative and other 
functions in the ship’s ports of call, as stated by Kerr, L.J in “The Derby”,15 where the 
court held that the lack of an ITF blue card in respect of the crew pay requirements does 
not amount to a breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness resting with the owner. 
 
Since the concept of seaworthiness is wide-reaching, it might be found in English case 
law that aside from the obligation of the owner or the disponent owner to provide an 
adequate documentation for the performance of the intended charter party, the 
competence of the crew and their number on board the ship have proved to have relevant 
materiality to the doctrine of seaworthiness as illustrated in the judgment ruled by the 
court in “The Hongkong Fir”. In this case, the vessel which was chartered on the 
Baltime form was considered unseaworthy with regard to the incompetence of the engine 
room complement. However, the repudiation of the charter party by the charterers was 
held wrongfully taken, in the sense that the undertaking of seaworthiness is not a 
condition of the charter contract16 and thus repudiation may be a possible remedy only if 
the breach goes to the root of the contract or deprives the charterer from the whole 
benefit of the charter party. The American Arbitrators have followed the same principle 
in extending the interpretation of seaworthiness to other non-technical components as 
reflected trough a number of cases, such as in “The Augvald”. 17 The ship was held to be 
unseaworthy for lack of a valid weevil-free certificate, necessary for the transport of its 
cargo of grain.   
    
                                                 
15 Alfred C. Toepfer Schiffahrtsgesellschaft G.M.B.H. v. Tossa Marine Co. Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s  
    Rep.325, 331 
16 See supra-note 4, at p.82    
17 See supra-note 14. 
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   In a voyage charter party, it is essential to point out that the implied or express warranty 
of seaworthiness applies at the beginning of each stage of the voyage according to what 
is called the doctrine of stages. However, the link is always there between the different 
stages in the sense that a vessel which is fit for the loading stage, but not fit to encounter 
the perils of a sea adventure may be considered unseaworthy when presented for 
loading.18            
 
It might be argued that the standard tanker chartering forms are more comprehensive 
than those used for the dry cargo market, with regard to the formulation of the express 
terms pertaining to the seaworthiness of the vessel.19 This exhaustive way in describing 
the vessel’s condition in tanker forms may be explained on the one hand by the specific 
operational requirements for the ships carrying oil or chemical cargoes and on the other 
hand by the fact that the tanker markets are deeply influenced by the charterers, rather 
than by the owners, who have the upper hand in dry cargo chartering. Notwithstanding 
these considerations, it should be noted that the English courts have not assessed the 
seaworthiness of a vessel, according to the strict literal requirements enunciated in the 
charter party,20 but as a matter of evaluating the influence of the defects detected on a 
ship, with regard to their commercial significance for the contemplated adventure. In 
other words, minor defects that may not jeopardize the safety of the ship or the integrity 
of its cargo are not sufficient grounds for disqualifying the ship as being unseaworthy.   
 
Another instrumental point that should be borne in mind is the distinction made in 
some judicial circumstances between seaworthiness and fittedness. This latter concept, 
used mainly when involving the right of the charterer to rescind the contract by relying 
on the cancellation date, is not necessarily synonymous to seaworthiness.21  
 
 
                                                 
18 Dixon v. Sadler (1839) 5 M. & W. 305 
19 See SHELLTIME 4, clause 2; BPVOY 4, clause 1.  
20 It might be referred to the case of  “the Arianna” Athenian Tankers Management S.A. v. Pyrena  
    Shipping Inc [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 376 
21 Ibid, 390 
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2.2.3 Consequences of unseaworthiness 
 
With regard to time charter parties, it has been established that a breach of the 
undertaking of seaworthiness by the owner may not, in principle, amount to allowing 
the charterer to consider the charter party as discharged.22 In essence, the refusal or the 
failure of the owner to rectify a deficiency that goes to the root of the contract to the 
extent that it may frustrate its commercial purpose could be construed by the courts as 
a repudiation of the contract entitling the charterer to rescind the charter party.23  
 
It should also be noted that the charterer may put an end to the contract by virtue of the 
cancellation clause, 24  in case of the failure of the owner to rectify any arising 
unseaworthiness by the cancellation date. In principle, this available remedy is not 
specific to unseaworthiness, but it is granted generally after the breach of any provision 
of the charter party. Particularly, the level of seaworthiness required for the sake of the 
cancellation clause is absolute, and not merely limited to a due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy even with the existence of a Paramount clause in the charter party 
incorporating the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.  
 
Further discussion about the absolute obligation of seaworthiness and its consequences 
on the parties of the charter party will be carried out within our attempt to review the 
doctrine of seaworthiness in the context of the security regime. 
 
2.3 Seaworthiness under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
 
Whereas in common law, the shipowner is under an absolute obligation to provide a 
seaworthy ship, the undertaking of the carrier25 pursuant to a bill of lading is  replaced 
                                                 
22 See Wilford, Michael et al, Time charters, 5th ed  (London : Lloyd’s of London Press, 2003), 104   
23 According to the holding of Sellers L.J. in “The Hongkong Fir “case, discussed earlier. 
24 See Baltime, clause 21 and NYPE, clause 16.00. 
25 The determination of the identity of the carrier is of crucial importance when dealing with liabilities 
pertaining to a contract of carriage of goods by sea, governed by the Hague-Visby Rules. Indeed, the 
shipper may encounter difficulties in respecting some provisions of the rules, especially, the time-bar of 
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by a an obligation to exercise ´ due diligence´ to ensure the seaworthiness of the ship if 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated into the charter party through a 
Paramount clause.26 In the present discussion, what is relevant is the allocation of 
liability as between shipowners and charterers of liabilities to cargo owners. In a first 
step, a look into the way the courts have interpreted the standard of due diligence will 
be made then later on it will be relevant to  highlight the possible defences and the 
limitation of liability scheme available to the shipowners in this respect. 
 
2.3.1 The concept of due diligence 
 
It should be borne in mind that the concept of due diligence is not appropriate in the 
common law, as there is the absolute obligation of seaworthiness discussed earlier. 
Generally, the undertaking of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship 
before and at the beginning of the voyage as stipulated by article III, rule 1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules has been construed by the courts as ranging from the 
beginning of loading until the vessel starts on the voyage. 27  The seaworthiness 
obligation under the ´due diligence´ doctrine embraces the three distinct aspects of 
seaworthiness recognised at common law, namely the physical condition of the ship, 
the efficiency of the crew and equipment, and the cargoworthiness of the vessel.28 
Moreover, the courts have considered that the duty of due diligence is nearly 
equivalent to that of the common law duty of care, 29  except that this personal 
                                                                                                                                             
12-months for the institution of the cargo claim. Commonly, the shipowner is considered to be the 
Carrier, even if the bill of lading is signed in some circumstances by the master, according to the order 
of the charterer by virtue of express terms stipulated by the charter party, such as the ones found in 
clause 8 of the NYPE. However, the charterer may fill the position of the carrier, pursuant to article I (a) 
of the Hague/Hague -Visby Rules, mainly if the master in signing the bill of lading was considered as an 
agent of the charterer. The charterer, in an attempt to transfer liability to the shipowner seeks to include 
in the bill of lading a demise clause. Moreover,  the charterer is required to indemnify the shipowner if 
he signs a bill of lading, imposing greater liability than that contained in the charter party, according to 
the holding of Lord Denning MR in Coast Lines Ltd v. Hudig [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53, 56          
26 See SHELLTIME 4, clause 38; NYPE 93, clause 31. 
27 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd. [1959] AC 589, 603 
28 See Wilson, John F, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 3rd ed (London : Financial Times/Pitman   
    Publishing, 1998), 186     
29 As stated by Lord Devlin in Union of India v. N.V. Reederij Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 223,  
     235       
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undertaking can not be delegated. From this standpoint, the shipowner remains liable 
for any loss, damage or delay of the cargo as a result of the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel, even if the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy is 
carried out by another person, who may be the servants of the shipowner or even an 
independent contractor such as a reputable classification society.  
 
 In order to illustrate the way the concept of ´due diligence´ may be interpreted in a 
seaworthiness-related dispute, a leading authority may be found in “The Fjord Wind” 
case.30 The ship was time chartered on the NYPE form and voyage chartered later by 
the disponent owner on the Norgrain form for the carriage of a cargo of soya beans 
from the River Plate to Europe. After loading, the vessel suffered an engine failure, 
needing lengthy repairs, which imposed the need for the cargo to be transhipped. The 
claimants (cargo owners) made a claim against the owners and the disponent owners 
for delay and expenses.    
   
The voyage charter party stipulated in clause 1 an absolute obligation of    
seaworthiness, whereas it imposed by virtue of clause 35 a duty of due diligence to 
make the ship seaworthy. The claim of the plaintiffs was dismissed in the first instance, 
but the judgment of the Court of Appeal raised two important issues about the ´due 
diligence´ doctrine, that may serve for guidance in this respect.31     
 
Firstly, the conflict between the absolute obligation of seaworthiness (Cl.1) and the 
obligation to exercise due diligence to ensure seaworthiness (Cl.35), was settled by the 
court in favour of the latter obligation, in taking as a basis the prominent decision on 
contract interpretation of Lord Hoffmann in ICS v. West Bromwich Building Society  
where he stated :32   
         Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
                                                 
30 Eridania S.P.A. & Ors v. Rudolf A. Oetker & Ors [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.191 
31 See Hooper, James, ´ New Guidance for Owners on Issues of Due Diligence´(21 June 2000)  
    Lloyd’s List  
32 [1998] 1 WLR 896 
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         convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which  
         would reasonably have been available to the parties in a situation in which  
         they were at the time of the contract. 
Secondly, the matter of whether the vessel was unseaworthy before and at the 
commencement of the voyage was examined by making reference to the classic standard, 
based on the answer to the question:33 
         Would a prudent owner require that the defect be made good before sending  
         his ship to sea, had he known of it? 
It was concluded by the court that the vessel was unseaworthy, with regard to the adverse 
consequences that could happen during the voyage if the deficiency were not rectified.  
What is interesting in the present case is that the disponent owners were deemed not to 
have proven that they exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy,34 in relying on 
the work performed by the engine builders. It was established by the court that the 
unique way by which the owners can discharge their burden is to show that they 
delegated to the engine builders the responsibility of carrying out a thorough 
investigation about the previous failures and that the engine builders exercised due care 
in doing so. The owners were held liable for failure to perform their duties in this 
situation, as they were required to show that they and the engine builders between them 
did not overlook any line of inquiry which competent experts could reasonably be 
expected to have pursued.35 
Moreover, it has been established by French and Belgian courts that a surveyor’s 
certificate is not prima facie proof of due diligence.36 Therefore, a surveyor’s certificate 
of navigability may lose its efficacy when a deficiency is clearly established.   
 
2.3.2 Defences of the carrier 
 
                                                 
33 See McFadden v. Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B.697, 706 
34 According to the wording of article IV (1) of the Hague-Visby Rules. 
35 Supra, note 30, 192 
36 Court d´Appel de Rouen , June 11, 1948, DMF 1950, 65; Rechtbank van Koophandel te  
   Antwerpen,  October 17, 1995, [1995] ETL 130, as cited by  Tetley, William,  ´ Due Diligence to  
    Make the Vessel Seaworthy´ < http://upload.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/ch15.pdf> 40 ( 25 June 2005)  
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Apart from a situation where the unseaworthiness of the vessel is a matter of fact, the 
Carrier is entitled under article IV, rule 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules to rely upon 
a list of 17 exculpatory exceptions and defences, including, inter alia, the act, neglect, 
or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation 
or in the management of the ship. In this regard, it should be noted that Art.21 (a) of 
the French domestic legislation enshrined in the Law No.66-420 of 18 June 196637 
imposes on the carrier an obligation of due diligence in the same way as in Art.III (1) 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, taking into account the intended voyage and the 
cargo contemplated. In addition, the carrier may exculpate himself from liability, if he 
proves that the cause of the damage or the loss is among the 9 immunities afforded in 
Art.27 of the French domestic legislation.  
 
It should be mentioned that the French international carriage law incorporates the spirit 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in terms of the available exceptions. The carrier is 
required to determine the cause of the loss and that it falls within unseaworthiness and 
is not attributable to want of due diligence or covered by the catalogue of exculpatory 
exceptions listed in Art.IV (2).38  
 
2.4 Seaworthiness under the Hamburg Rules 
 
Under the United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (The Hamburg 
Rules), the Carrier is defined as any person by whom or in whose name a contract of 
carriage of goods by sea has been concluded with a shipper.39 Whereas the obligation 
of ´due diligence to make the ship seaworthy´ is expressly stipulated in the Hague and 
the Hague-Visby Rules in art.III (1), this duty is rather implied in the Hamburg Rules 
from the wording of art.5 (1).40 In this context, the responsibility of the carrier consists 
                                                 
37 Ibid, 43   
38 Ibid, 45  
39 The definition provided in art.1 is broader than the one given in the Hague/Hague- Visby Rules and  
    may cover any non-vessel owning carrier. 
40 ´The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in 
delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took place while the goods were in 
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of ensuring the safe condition of the cargo during the whole period that it is in his 
custody. Therefore, the issue of seaworthiness under the Hamburg Rules does not seem 
substantial for a potential liability of the carrier in isolation from the condition of the 
cargo. In other words, the liability of the carrier rests on the safe and sound condition 
of the cargo carried, not on the condition of the carrying ship.41 
 
It might be argued that this new standard brought in by the Hamburg Rules seems 
satisfactory for those who considered that the obligations of the carrier under art.III (1) 
and art.III (2)42 of the Hague/Hague Visby Rules should be judged on the same basis.43 
The new regime of cargo liability switches the burden of proof onto the carrier to prove 
that he, his servants or agents including independent contractors, took all reasonable 
measures required to remedy the circumstances that caused the loss, the damage or the 
delay in delivery sustained by the cargo owners.  
 
Whereas the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not contain provisions regarding loss 
caused by delay in delivery of the goods, the Hamburg Rules cover this issue,44 which 
may cause a loss of market for the shipper. While common law jurisdictions left the 
matter to the reasonable contemplation of the parties, some continental countries such 
as Norway covers it in Art.5 (1) and Art.5 (2) of its Maritime Code of 1994.45 
 
There is one final point that has to be addressed in this section. The burden of proof is 
based on fault of the carrier and since there is no catalogue of exceptions as in the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the negligence in the navigation or management of the 
vessel46  is not considered under the Hamburg Rules as a defence for the carrier. 
                                                                                                                                             
his charge as defined in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all 
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences´. 
41 See Tilleke & Gibbins, ´ Seaworthiness in Thai Law`  
<http://www.tillekeandgibbins.com/Publications/Newsletters/maritime/seaworth.htm> (25 July 2005)   
42 Under this provision, the carrier is required to look ´properly and carefully´ after the cargo during  
the carriage operation. 
43 See supra- note 28 at p.210    
44 See Art.5.1 of the Hamburg Rules. 
45As cited in Falkanger, Thor et al, Introduction to Maritime Law (Oslo : Tano Aschehoug, 1998), 277  
46 See Art.IV rule 2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
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Despite the absence of the catalogue of exculpatory exceptions, one should underline 
the fact that most of the possible exceptions in these Rules are implied.    
 
2.5 Warranty of seaworthiness in marine insurance 
 
 2.5.1 Seaworthiness in marine insurance 
 
The relevance of seaworthiness in marine insurance stems from the fact that if the ship 
is unseaworthy, a potential loss may be inevitable during the adventure, whereas the 
function of the insurance is to insure against unexpected risks. In matter of law, the 
English Marine Insurance Act (MIA) of 190647 is considered as the mother of all 
marine insurance statutes.48 This instrument has taken the lead in influencing the law 
of the subject matter in various other jurisdictions. From this perspective, it will be 
justified to refer from time to time within the discussion to the provisions of the Act as 
well as to other laws of some civil law countries.  In section 39(4) of the MIA, 
seaworthiness is defined as follows: 
       A ship is deemed to be seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to  
       encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured.  
At first sight, this definition is in harmony with the meaning of seaworthiness as 
discussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Despite the fact that the doctrine 
develops over time to reflect evolving knowledge and standards of ship construction,49 
a ship is not deemed to be perfect but, seaworthy in all respects, including, inter alia, 
the physical fitness, the crew and the documentation. In the context of marine 
insurance, the seaworthiness may be used as a warranty, to serve as a defence 
mechanism for the insurer rather than a liability imposing doctrine, as described earlier.     
 
 
                                                 
47 Adopted on 21 December 1906 to codify the law of marine insurance  
48 See Tetley, William, ´ Marine Insurance and the Conflict of Laws´ in Huybrechts, Marc et al (eds),  
    Marine Insurance at the Turn of The Millennium (Antwerp, Oxford : Intersentia, 1999), 306 
49 See Bennett, Howard N, The Law of Marine Insurance (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1996), 294   
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2.5.2 Voyage policy 
 
In a voyage policy, there is an implied warranty of seaworthiness by the assured at the 
commencement of the voyage, according to s. 39(1)50  of the Act. Moreover, this 
warranty operates at the commencement of each stage of the adventure if the voyage is 
divided into several stages. Such a case may be invoked if a ship during the same 
voyage calls two ports that require different sets of equipment or documentation. This 
specific situation will be discussed later, when dealing with the doctrine of 
seaworthiness under the security regime. However, there is no warranty that the vessel 
will continue to be seaworthy, thus negligence of the master or the crew after the 
beginning of the voyage will not constitute a defence for the insurer.51    
     
2.5.3 Time policy 
 
It is an established doctrine that in a time policy, there is no warranty of seaworthiness 
at any stage of the adventure, but in case of ´privity´ of the assured to send an 
unseaworthy ship to sea, the insurer is entitled to discharge any liability, arising out of 
a loss caused by unseaworthiness.52The interpretation of the concept of ´privity´ has 
given rise to controversial debates within legal circles. In this respect, case law reveals 
that the wording ´ actual fault or privity´´ existing in the 1924 and 1957 limitation 
conventions53 and the term ´´ wilful misconduct´´ have been rejected by the courts for 
not providing valid interpretations of the doctrine of ´privity´ as has been reflected in 
“The Eurysthenes”. 54  From another perspective, it was held that ´privity´ may be 
                                                 
50 In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of the voyage the ship  
   shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the particular adventure insured. 
51 See Soyer, Baris, Warranties in Marine Insurance (London, Sydney : Cavendish Publishing, 2001), 
95    
52 Pursuant to section 39(5) of the MIA. The rationale behind this provision may be the fact that the 
insured vessel may be at sea, when a time policy begins, which does not allow the assured to check the 
condition of the vessel. 
53 This has been considered as a benchmark in the International Convention Relating to the Limitation of 
the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships adopted in Brussels in 10 October 1957, to determine if the 
shipowner is entitled to limit his liability. 
54 See Compania Maritime San Basilio v. Oceanus Mutual Undertaking Association (Bermuda)  
   Ltd   [1977] 1 QB 49 
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construed as ´knowledge and consent´, especially ´turning a blind eye´ to the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel, including reluctance to carry out an inquiry about the 
deficiencies. In this respect, Lord Scott provided in the judgment related to “The Star 
Sea” 55 a descriptive holding of the state of mind related to a ´ blind eye knowledge´, 
which may prevail where a decision is issued in order not to enquire into an untargeted 
or speculative suspicion. 
   
Another crucial issue that merits consideration in the present discussion is the 
identification of the person to whom the ´privity´ requirement applies. In this regard, it 
has been submitted as a matter of English case law that the principle governing the 
attribution of knowledge to a company 56  requires the search for the company’s 
´directing mind and will´57 or what was called ´ brains and nerve centre´.58 However, a 
precise vision is not efficient unless it is based on the literal construction of s.39 (5). 
This provision imposes the identification of the persons involved in the decision 
making process related to sending the ship to sea and whose knowledge is reasonably 
to count as the act of the company. It is not possible to cover the wide scope of 
´privity´ in this section, but for the purpose of this dissertation, the concept will be 
illustrated in the next chapter with regard to its implementation under the security 
regime.   
 
It should be stressed that the issue of causation is of paramount importance for the 
determination of the liability of the insurer. In principle, if the unseaworthiness is 
found as one of the proximate causes59 of the loss, the assured will be precluded from 
recovery unless he is not privy to this specific unseaworthiness, when sending the ship 
                                                 
55 Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd v. Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd and la Réunion Européenne [2001]  
    1 Lloyd’s Rep.389, 414  
56 The term ´company´ will be used in the context of the ISPS Code, referring to the shipowning or the  
     operating company. In addition, it will concern corporate companies, not individual ones. 
57 Such opinion was advocated by Viscount Haldane LC in  Lennard´s Carrying Co Ltd v. Asiatic  
    Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705, 714  
58 As cited by Denning LJ in HL Bolton(Engineering) Co Ltd v. TJ Graham & Sons Ltd [1956] 3ALL  
59 The principle of causa proxima has been used for a long time in marine insurance, before the    
    emergence of the recent school of thought, based on the efficient or dominant cause of the loss. 
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to sea.60  However, the insurer may be liable to indemnify the assured for a loss caused 
apart from the unseaworthiness of the vessel by another proximate cause expressed in 
the insurance policy as in “The Miss Jay Jay”. 61   
 
Unlike the MIA 1906, the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan (NMIP) 62 does not  
distinguish between a voyage policy and a time policy63 in terms of the nature of the 
undertaking of seaworthiness. The liability resulting from breach of this warranty will 
depend on the corrective action carried out by the assured, either before or after the 
commencement of the voyage. Moreover, the burden of proving that the ship is 
unseaworthy rests with the insurer, who also has the right to demand a survey of the 
ship for ascertaining its seaworthiness.64 It should be noted that unseaworthiness in the 
NMIP 1996 depends mainly on the time the defects are detected by the assured. It is 
reasonable with the development of the communication technology at sea these days 
that the assured can take the necessary steps to rectify the defects unless they are latent 
and the loss occurs before he has constructive knowledge of the unseaworthiness.    
 
2.6 Conflict of laws 
 
It is essential to bear in mind that the interpretation of the concept of seaworthiness as 
contained in charter parties, bills of lading or insurance policies depends deeply on the 
conflict of laws rules used in the different legislations. Despite the fact that the 
majority of the standard forms of the contracts mentioned above encompass an express 
choice of law clause, there may be circumstances where this provision is not available. 
In this situation, recourse will be to the rules of conflict of laws enshrined in the 
national legislation springing from some international conventions. Among the 
                                                 
60 See supra-note 51, 111-112  
61 See The J. J. Lloyd Instruments Ltd v. Northern Star Insurance Co. Ltd  [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep  
    32(CA) 
62 The provisions of the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan( NMIP ) of 1996, version 2003 can be found 
at:  <http://www.norwegianplan.no/eng/index.htm> 
63  Ibid. section 3-22 provides that the insurer is not liable for loss that is a consequence of the ship not being in a  
seaworthy condition, provided that the assured knew or ought to have known of the ship's defects at such a time that it would 
have been possible for him to intervene.   
64 Ibid. section 3- 23.  
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international instruments used for the determination of the proper applicable law of the 
charter parties is the EC Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
called The Rome Convention, 65 which expressly refers in art.4 (b) to single-voyage 
charter parties. The Convention is enacted by the majority of the European countries, 
including England, However, the classic English common law rules still have a word to 
say in the conflict of law arena.   
 
With regard to charter parties, it has been stated in Art.1 (1) of the Rome Convention66 
that the basic rule in choosing the proper law of the contract is the express choice or, in 
the absence of express choice, the implied choice demonstrated with reasonable 
certainty. Failing this, the applicable law is that of the country with which the contract 
is most closely connected. In this situation, Art.4 (2) of the Rome Convention67 states 
that the closest and most real connection standard may be construed, for example, from 
the place of performance of the charter party. It should be noted that the English 
common law approach gives guidance to the common–law and Commonwealth nations 
which have not adopted choice of law statutes.68 Along this dissertation, reference will 
be made, if necessary to some specific differences that may arise out of the 
interpretation of the doctrine of seaworthiness by different jurisdictions.  
 
2.7 The concept of seaworthiness under the ISM Code 
 
Before concluding the discussion in this chapter, it is essential to highlight the 
substantive impact of the recent mandatory IMO regulations, especially the ISM Code 
on the evaluation of the seaworthiness of a ship. It is reasonable to argue that the 
standard of seaworthiness with which a vessel must comply is to be tested against the 
                                                 
65 See Tetley, William & Wilkins, Robert C, International Conflict of Laws: Common, Civil and  
    Maritime (Montréal, Québec: Editions Y. Blais, 1994), 256 
66 Ibid, 256 
67 Ibid,257 
68 Ibid, 260 
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requirements of the ISM Code, as it has been embedded in some recent judgments 
issued by the English courts in this regard, particularly in “The Eurasian Dream”. 69  
 
It should be mentioned that the ISM and the ISPS Codes, both based on written 
procedures, reporting and internal audit, enshrine the same underlying philosophy in 
terms of involving the ship management in ensuring that a culture of safety and 
security respectively is prevailing on board a ship. Moreover, there are striking 
similarities between the codes in the sense that the two instruments represent the two 
sides of a common management system coin, with ISM directed at internal risks and 
ISPS at external ones and both have been incorporated into SOLAS Convention as 
separate chapters.   
 
2.8 Concluding Remarks 
 
  The discussion in the present chapter has attempted to shed light on the manner the 
concept of seaworthiness is dealt with under different legal frameworks, from the 
absolute express or implied obligation in English common law to the due diligence 
doctrine dictated by the provisions of the Hague/Hague Visby Rules and the Hamburg 
Rules. Under this spectrum, it is necessary to stress the fact that the due diligence duty 
to provide a seaworthy vessel extends to the whole period of the voyage in the case of 
the Hamburg Rules, whereas it is solely applied before and at the commencement of 
the adventure with respect to the Hague/Hague Visby Rules. 
  
 In addition, an effort has been made to explore the doctrine of seaworthiness within an 
insurance context, either in voyage or in time policies. In this regard, it has been 
noticed that the English law in the matter reflected in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
does not impose a warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy as it does in a voyage 
                                                 
69Papera Traders Co. Ltd & Ors v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd & Another [2002] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep.719. The judgment in this case provides a significant insight into the way the   seaworthiness issues 
will be litigated in courts, having the ISM Code philosophy in mind. The ship was held unseaworthy 
because of the inadequacy of the documentation, the incompetence of the crew  and the deficient 
condition of the equipment onboard. 
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policy, but presents the ´ privity´ of the assured in sending an unseaworthy vessel to 
sea as a possible defence for the insurer to avoid liability for recovery. From a different 
perspective, the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1996 does not distinguish 
between voyage and time policies with regard to seaworthiness and provides a flexible 
approach in term of ascertainment of liabilities. The recourse to the rules of conflict of 
laws is a valuable tool for determining especially the proper law of a charter party and 
thus interpreting the nature and the extent of the obligation of seaworthiness under the 
framework of a specific jurisdiction.   
 
Finally, it is to note that the common features of the ISM and the ISPS Codes will be 
of great assistance in illuminating the manner the standard of seaworthiness of a vessel 
will be benchmarked under the ISPS Code and the maritime security requirements 
stipulated by the amendments to the International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea, 
1974.    
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CHAPTER 3 
SEAWORTHINESS UNDER THE SECURITY REGIME 
 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
As has been noted in the previous chapter, the standard of seaworthiness with which a 
ship must comply will be tested against the requirements of the ISPS Code and the 
maritime security provisions stipulated by the amendments to the International 
Convention of Safety of Life at Sea, 1974. Compliance with the security regime is not 
in itself conclusive evidence of seaworthiness, but a non-compliant ship in respect of 
the security regime is likely to be considered by the courts as unseaworthy.  
Moreover, it is essential to highlight the fact that the implementation of the ISPS Code 
is based on a documented scheme that may provide valuable pieces of evidence in case 
of a potential dispute arising out of a security-related incident. This interesting aspect 
of the code will be discussed in detail at the outset of this chapter. 
 
It should be mentioned that the present chapter will attempt to provide a 
comprehensive insight into the seaworthiness issue under the security regime, both in 
the context of a common law perspective characterized by an absolute obligation of the 
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel, and in the context of the Hague/Hague -
Visby Rules or the Hamburg Rules which impose on the carrier a duty to exercise ´due 
diligence´ to provide a seaworthy ship. Furthermore, issues such as limitation of 
liability and the controversial doctrine of ´privity´, raised earlier in this dissertation will 
be examined with respect to the implementation of the security regime.   
 
3.2 The main features of the security regime 
 
The purpose of this section is not to present the entire scheme of the ISPS Code and the 
relevant security provisions brought by the amendments to the SOLAS Convention 
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1974, but rather to point out the key features of the security system that may be 
significant when ascertaining whether the shipowner has fulfilled his duties with regard 
to the proper implementation of the security requirements.  
 
3.2.1 Main requirements of the security regime 
 
The company is required under the ISPS Code to establish a security system on board 
its ships in terms of providing adequate equipment, documentation and personnel. 
Concerning the first item, the vessel should be equipped with an automatic 
identification system (AIS), 70  a ship security alert system (SSAS) 71  and a ship 
identification number to be permanently marked internally and externally on the hull of 
the vessel.72Regarding the documentation, the following items have to be available at 
any time on board the ship: 
• a valid international ship security certificate or a valid interim international ship 
security certificate; 
• a continuous synopsis record (CSR); 73 
• a ship security plan; 74 
• the records75 
 Apart from the content of the records, the master shall have on board the following   
information76: 
• The entities responsible for appointing the shipboard personnel, such as ship 
management companies and manning agents;  
                                                 
70 Chapter V, regulation 19. 
71 Chapter XI-2, regulation 6. It is essential to mention that the performance of the SSAS should not be 
inferior to the standards adopted by the International Maritime Organisation, prescribed in resolution 
MSC.136 (76).   
72 Chapter XI-1, Regulation 3.   
73 Chapter XI-1, Regulation 5. This record contains details of the ship, such as, the name, flag, and the 
issuing entity of the international ship security certificate.   
74 ISPS/A/9 and ISPS/B/9. 
75 See sections ISPS/A/10.1 and ISPS/B/10.1. This set of information includes, inter alia, training, drills, 
exercises; internal audits and review of the security activities carried out on board the ship. They should 
be kept onboard the ship, for at least the minimum period specified by the Administration, bearing in 
mind the provisions of regulation XI-2/9.2.3, which require keeping records of the last 10 calls at port 
facilities.      
76 SOLAS , chapter XI-2/5 and ISPS/B/6.1 
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• The contact details of the voyage charterer or the time charterer. The charterer 
will be responsible in this situation for the employment of the vessel. 
 
With regard to personnel, the company is required to have a company security officer 
who is responsible for ensuring that the ship’s security assessment is carried out and that 
the security plan is prepared accordingly. In addition, a ship security officer should be 
assigned for each ship to deal with the implementation and the maintenance of the ship 
security plan and all the security-related functions on board.  
 
 It is worthy of mention that the sub-committee on Standards of Training and 
Watchkeeping of IMO endorsed in its 36th session77 draft amendments to the STCW 
convention and to parts A and B of the STCW code, related to the minimum mandatory 
training and certification requirements for persons to be designated as Ship Security 
Officers (SSOs). 78  Also, the same sub-committee agreed on a draft MSC circular, 
providing guidance on training and documentation for Company Security Officers 
(CSOs) including a table of knowledge, understanding and proficiencies relevant to their 
duties. Therefore, it will be possible to verify the level of training of the SSOs by means 
of a certificate of proficiency and not simply through a statement of the company.79          
 
Added to the requirements mentioned earlier, a vessel should prior to entry into a port of 
a contracting government provide a set of information, including the security level at 
which the ship operated in the 10 previous ports of call.80 The data received is analysed 
by duly authorized officers of the government of the port concerned, before deciding 
whether to allow or to deny entry to the vessel.    
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Held between 10 and 14 January 2005  
78 See IMO, ´ Training for SSOs- amendments to STCW Convention and Code endorsed´ IMO News  
    No.1 2005, 19   
79 See International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), Model Ship Security Plan (London : ICS, 2003), iii  
80 XI-2/9.2.1 and ISPS/B/4.37- 4.39 
26 
3.2.2  The management of the security system  
 
It is notable that the compliance of a ship with the substance of the ISPS Code and the 
relevant regulations may not be fully realized by providing merely the necessary 
equipment, documentation and personnel, but it is mainly dependent on the way the 
management of the security system is carried out on board by the company. What should 
be borne in mind is the fact that the company was required before the advent of the ISPS 
Code and even the ISM Code to establish a system of management and supervision of 
the operations onboard its ships. Otherwise, its right to limit liability might be denied, as 
has been decided by the English courts in “The Marion”81 and “The Lady Gwendolen”82. 
 
What is interesting about the ISPS Code is its documented and structured scheme, which 
ensure trough the records kept on board ships a follow up of the management of the 
security system and at the same time a ´paper trail´ that may serve for valuable 
documentary evidence in the hands of the litigator in case of a potential dispute between 
the parties involved in the carriage of a specific cargo.83  
 
3.3 Absolute obligation of seaworthiness 
 
 At English common law, the company is required to provide a seaworthy ship in the 
absolute sense, in respect of the security matters. Thus, it is evident that the vessel should 
be fully compliant with the provisions of the ISPS Code and the relevant amendments to 
SOLAS Convention 1974, with no available defence for the company in case of any 
damage or loss of the cargo resulting out of a security-related incident caused by the 
unseaworthiness of the ship. In order to illustrate the way the courts may deal with the 
absolute obligation of seaworthiness issue, we will consider a hypothetical scenario, in 
which an explosion of a medium size takes place in a container carried onboard the ship, 
                                                 
81 [1984] A.C.563.  
82 [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.335 CA 
83 Usually, disputes arise out of the damage or the loss of the cargo and the plaintiffs contend that    
    the unseaworthiness of the vessel was the cause of the damage or the loss sustained.   
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causing damage to both the cargo and the vessel. The investigation carried out after the 
incident reveals that the explosion originated from an odd piece of luggage, which was 
put inside the container during the cargo handling operation, probably by an 
unauthorized person, who managed to gain access to the ship.  
 
It would not be surprising if the courts held the company to be liable for non-compliance 
with the requirements of the ISPS Code, particularly with the measures that should be 
carried out for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship84 and, consequently, 
consider the vessel to be unseaworthy. In this state of mind, the courts are likely to 
approve the claims presented by the cargo owners for the damage or the loss sustained. 
What is specific to the absolute obligation of seaworthiness is the fact that the company 
will not be relieved from liability towards the cargo owners whatever efforts were 
deployed in properly carrying out all the required measures for the control of the access 
to the ship, pursuant to the terms of the ISPS Code, if these efforts failed. 
 
It should be highlighted that the security scheme established onboard the ship may entail 
some latent failures. These dormant deficiencies, related, inter alia, to the maintenance 
management and the organisation of procedures, trigger the preconditions that result in 
the creation of active breaches.85 The latent deficiencies may not be discovered during a 
regular inspection of the ship, which exposes the company to an inevitable liability in the 
context of an absolute obligation of seaworthiness.                    
 
3.4 The concept of due diligence under the security regime 
 
Since most of the contracted charter parties such as NYPE 93 and the related bills of 
lading are subject to the provisions of the various international conventions on carriage 
of goods by sea such as the Hague/Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, it will be interesting to 
                                                 
84 These measures that should be clearly stipulated in the ship security plan are mentioned in sections  
    ISPS/A/9.4 and ISPS/B/9.9 
85 See ´ Accidents are They Avoidable? ´ (November 2004) 17 UK Club: Loss Prevention News 1,3 
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look at the concept of ´due diligence´ in providing a seaworthy vessel, under the security 
regime. 
 
As there have yet to be any ISPS Code related cases, the manner in which the courts 
have ruled upon disputes in the context of the ISM Code is likely to be a source of 
inspiration,86 especially with regard to the seaworthiness issue, which is the core focus of 
the present discussion. This vision seems to be reasonable, in view of the existing 
similarities mentioned earlier between both Codes.  
 
However, we might argue that since the ISM Code constitutes merely a framework for 
the implementation of the existing safety and environment protection regulations 
embedded in the SOLAS Convention 1974, it may be considered a benchmark for 
assessing fault or lack of due diligence in connection with cargo claims. It is not a new 
standard of seaworthiness nevertheless.87 The ISPS Code, unlike the ISM Code has 
brought, for the first time, the new leg of security management to the realm of shipping. 
Moreover, it has been based on a dual structure, involving port facilities as well in the 
implementation of its requirements.     
 
Therefore, these specific features of the ISPS Code are to be considered when evaluating 
the seaworthiness of a ship under the security regime. In other words, the review of the 
way the courts have considered the issues of seaworthiness and due diligence under the 
scope of the ISM Code will merely provide indications about the future outcome of a 
dispute, involving allegations of seaworthiness that may arise out of a security related 
incident. 
As was seen in the previous chapter, the courts will probably take into account the 
practices and the procedures of the industry at the relevant material time, 88  when 
assessing the seaworthiness of a ship. This attitude was followed in the case of ´´ The 
                                                 
86 See Wilson, John, ´ The legal implications of the ISPS Code´  
   < http://www.ics.org.hk/talks_03.htm > ( 22 July 2005)  
87 See Honka, Hannu, ´Main Obligations and Liabilities of the Carrier´ (2004) 27: 7/8  
   Transportrecht  278-280 
88 See supra-note 69, 736.  
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Eurasian Dream´´, 89  in which consideration by the courts was given to the legal 
relevance of the ISM code in the context of an assessment as to the owner’s compliance 
with the obligations of seaworthiness and due diligence under Art. III (1) and Art. IV (1) 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.90  
 
Since the ISPS Code is today part of the mandatory IMO instruments, that every prudent 
shipowner has to comply with, it is likely that when considering the relevant duties and 
obligations of owners, including issues of seaworthiness and due diligence, the English 
Courts, especially are likely to pay credence to and refer to the ISPS Code.91 Moreover, a 
shipowner will not be able to contend that a terrorist attack involving his vessel was 
unforeseeable and was beyond his control,92 but he will be required instead to prove that 
he did whatever he could in order to ensure the effectiveness of the security system 
onboard his vessel before and at the beginning of the voyage as per the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules. In this respect, the content of the judgment in the case of the “Fjord Wind” 
93 reviewed in the previous chapter  provides valuable guidelines on how a non-delegable 
duty of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel should be fulfilled. 
 
Against that background, it is worth examining first the instrumental documentation 
forming the core of the Code, in an attempt to show how a company can exercise due 
diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage to establish a credible security 
system, then to assess the potential impact of the level of compliance in port facilities on 
the seaworthiness of a ship.   
 
3.4.1 Ship Security Plan (SSP) 
 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 See Michel, Keith, War, Terror and Carriage by Sea ( London, Singapore : LLP, 2004), 826    
91 See Clark, Julian, ´ISPS- another Bur´ (November 2004)  
  <http://www.else.co.uk/Documents/The%20Charterer%20November%202004.pdf> (25 June 2005) 
92 See Carey Christopher E, ´Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Potential Civil liabilities  
   and Defense)´ (2004) Tulane Maritime Law Journal 5 
93 See supra-note 30.  
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It should be noted that the Ship Security Plan (SSP) is developed on the basis of a Ship 
Security Assessment (SSA)94, which identifies, inter alia, possible threats to sensitive 
key shipboard operations 95 and determine the likelihood of occurrence of these threats. 
The SSA is undertaken by the Company Security Officer, taking into account, in 
particular the type of the ship, the type of the cargo and the trading routes. Therefore, 
care and thought needs to go into the performance of the SSA, in order to address the 
actual hazards that may endanger the security of the vessel. Having said that, it will be of 
great interest to trace the process through which a SSA is being prepared and to highlight 
the various challenges that may be faced by the company in this regard.  
 
Basically, the company may produce a generic Ship Risk Assessment of part or the 
entire of its ships, provided that a specific on-scene survey has been undertaken on each 
individual ship.96  
The key phases of the SSA are mainly:  
• collection of the information about the vessel and the other contributory factors 
such as the trading routes;  
• assessment of the existing security measures;  
• identification of the weaknesses via the on-scene survey and their assessment. 
It is not in the ambit of the present discussion to elaborate on the pros and the cons of 
each step, however, a number of remarks deserve to be made in this respect. 
 
It should be mentioned that many companies have adopted since the inception of the 
ISPS Code, a generic SSA approach.97 Hence, it could be argued that the short time 
allocated for the companies to comply with the provisions of the Code was the driving 
force behind this strategy. However, as shown above, the risk analysis of the security of 
                                                 
94 ISPS/A/8.1 
95 ISPS/A/8.3 
96 See  Lloyd’s Register& IDS International, ´ ISPS Code- Practical Pack´ (31 March 2003) 
   < http://www.marinacivil.com/legislacion/ISPSIntro.pdf> ( 28 July 2005)  
97 See Magnusson Mads, ´ The ISPS Code- The RSO experience´, presented on a seminar on maritime 
terrorism organized by The Norwegian Shipowners' Mutual War Risks Insurance Association and the 
Norwegian Shipowners’ Association ( 28 October 2004) 
< http://www.rederi.no/Article.asp?ArticleID=5190 ( 30 July 2005) 
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a ship has to be supported by an on-scene survey, in order to confirm the credibility of 
the information collected about the specific vessel and to identify its actual weaknesses. 
Otherwise, the proposed countermeasures may not be effective to remedy the detected 
vulnerabilities.    
 
It is common practice for companies to entrust independent contractors such as 
Recognized Security Organisations (RSOs) with the performance of the SSA and the 
development of the SSP. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that a RSO has to 
demonstrate appropriate knowledge of ship and port operations, including knowledge of 
ship design and to show expertise in the relevant aspects of security.98 The general trend 
is that classification societies, especially IACS members such as Lloyd’s Register,99 
dominate the field as RSOs due to the work they have also accomplished under SOLAS. 
Such entities have included the security services in their process as a complementary to 
the safety framework already established trough the ISM Code. In fact, ISPS security 
verification audit can be conducted during the same ISM ship visit.  
 
However, it has been found by Lloyd’s Register that when the SSA has been carried out 
by sub-contractors on behalf of the companies, the proposed control options have 
sometimes been impractical. 100  Certainly, if we are to prevent such unsatisfactory 
outcomes, the SSA is to be accomplished by the Company Security Officer and his team, 
due to the fact that the personnel involved in system management are, on the one hand, 
familiarized with the daily procedures of the company and, on the other hand, capable of 
injecting much of common sense into the process.    
 
Bearing in mind that the company is under a non- delegable obligation to exercise due 
diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel, it will be difficult to exculpate itself from 
                                                 
98 See for more information section ISPS/B/ 4.5.  
99 It received formal recognition as an RSO from more than 50 States as stated at: 
    <http://www.lr.org/market_sector/marine/maritime-security/rso_status.htm> 
100 See Lloyd’s Register, ´ Learning from the ISPS Code´ (June 2004) 8 Horizons 22   
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liability,101 once a deficiency is detected in terms of the SSA or the SSP. Moreover, even 
a highly reputed RSO need not always be absolutely diligent as in the case of “The 
Muncaster Castle”.102 
 
Despite the fact that the SSP is a confidential document, the disclosure of a part or the 
whole of its content 103  during a court proceeding may be necessary in some 
circumstances, where litigator has clear grounds that the underlying causes of a security-
related incident creating damage or loss of a specific cargo were particularly embedded 
in the inadequacy of the SSP and its inability to address properly and effectively the 
security matters onboard the ship.  
 
From an ergonomic perspective, it is essential to underline that the SSP and the manuals 
of the security system should be user–friendly. Otherwise, the personnel who are 
assigned security matters will not be at ease when implementing the provisions of the 
plan. Moreover, the courts are likely to consider the vessel in this situation unseaworthy 
as it has been the case in the context of the ISM Code.104  
  
3.4.2 International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) 
 
Despite the fact that classifications societies were not conceived in the first place as 
specialists in carrying out security duties, they have been involved in the performance of 
the statutory surveys pertaining to the implementation of the ISPS Code. It could be 
                                                 
101 We may refer to the way the ´due diligence´ concept was demonstrated through the case of “The 
Fjord Wind”, discussed in the previous chapter.  
102 Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. v. Lancashire Shipping Co. [1961] Lloyd’s Rep. 57, [1961] AMC 
1357(H.L.). In this case, the carrier was held responsible since the ship repairers had not been diligent. 
103 Despite the confidentiality of the SSP, part or whole of it may be disclosed by the courts at the 
request of the insurers seeking information to prove the unseaworthiness of the vessel in an attempt to be 
exculpated from covering any potential damage or loss of the vessel. Such information can be 
discoverable by the assured in law suits, according to rule 31(6) of the Civil Procedures Rules (CPR) 
1998 , which came into force in England & Wales on 26 April 1999.The said rule provides: ´Standard 
disclosure requires a party to disclose only: a) the documents on which he relies; and b) the documents 
which– i) adversely affect his own case,ii) adversely affect another party’s case, or iii) support another 
party´case; and c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a practice direction´.         
104 We may refer to the case of “The Eurasian Dream” discussed earlier. See Supra- note 69. 
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argued that rush of the classification societies to be accredited the status of Recognized 
security Organisations was motivated by the potential financial earnings.105 In order to 
ensure uniformity in terms of the accomplishment of their security services the 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) published its revised 
procedural guidelines106 in which they provide the various members and associates of 
IACS with the methods and the criteria upon which an International Ship Security 
Certificate may be issued to a ship. It should be noted that if a RSO has been involved in 
the conduct of the ship SSA or the development of the SSP or any amendments thereto, 
it should not be allowed to approve the SSP or to conduct the verifications for the 
certification process in order to avoid any potential conflict of interest.107 Although, the 
procedural requirements established by IACS seem to be clearly formulated, a number of 
issues pertaining to the process of verification and certification may be raised. 
 
According to section 7.1(ii) of IACS procedural requirements, the verification for the 
issuance or the renewal of the ISSC will be based, inter alia, on the verification through a 
representative sample of the effectiveness of the security system implemented on board 
the vessel. Undoubtedly, we may argue whether this sampling approach may provide a 
credible indicator through which the effective implementation of the whole security 
system in place could be proved.  
In addition, it should be noted that a RSO, intending to carry out verification of the 
compliance with the requirements of the ISPS Code is required to have a documented 
system for the qualification and the continuous updating and competence of its auditors 
who are to perform the verification tasks. Notwithstanding the criteria laid down, the 
issuance of an ISSC by a highly reputed RSO may not be conclusive evidence that the 
                                                 
105 See ´Security Should not be a Class Issue´ (03 April 2003) Fairplay 
106 See IACS, ´ Procedural Requirements for ISPS Code certification´ (2003)  
< http://www.iacs.org.uk/preqs/PR24R5.pdf > ( 15 July 2005)   
   107 The Annex to the Interim Guidelines for the Authorization of Recognized Security  
         Organizations Acting On Behalf of the Administration and /or Designated Authority of a  
         Contracting Government ( MSC/Circ.1074 issued on 10 June 2003) stated therein: ´´ 2 In no      
         instance may the RSO approve, verify, or certify a work product that it has developed" (e.g.   
         preparation ship  security assessments, preparation ship security plans or of amendments under    
         review). 
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company exercised due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship. In this respect, it was held 
by the Supreme Court of Canada108 that the production of a certificate of seaworthiness 
was not sufficient to discharge the statutory onus of proof that due diligence was 
exercised to make the vessel seaworthy. Following this holding, the ISSC may loose its 
efficacy, once a deficiency has been clearly detected in the security system established 
on board the ship. The present situation highlights the issue of the potential liability that 
the RSO may face, especially due to a potential omission or negligence from their 
auditors in carrying out their duties.  
 
3.4.3 Liability of the Recognized Security Organisations 
 
It is not in the ambit of this section to cover all that has been said about the sensitive 
issue of liability of classification societies. However, the present discussion will attempt 
to point out the most relevant principles upon which a Recognized Security Organisation 
may be held liable for carrying out its duties pertaining to the security regime in an 
unacceptable manner. In this respect, it should be noted that, in general, the liability of 
classification societies has been dealt with from various perspectives.  
 
From a contractual prospective, the Class owes a duty of care in detecting the defects of 
the vessels surveyed and in notifying the owner or the charterer accordingly as stated by 
the court in´ The Great American´´.109 However, it was contended that the shipowner 
cannot rely on a deficient survey as a defence for exculpating himself from the obligation 
to exercise ´due diligence´ in providing a seaworthy vessel as per art.III (1) of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Moreover, the court considered in the case of “The Great 
American” that the recognition of liability against the classification societies will have 
the undesirable impact of placing the ultimate responsibility of seaworthiness of the 
vessel on these entities that have only brief contact with the ship during the whole year. 
 
                                                 
108 Goodfellow Lumber Sales Ltd v. Verreault [1971] S.C.R.522, 541, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep185, 194 
109 See Great American Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas 338 F.Supp.999 (S.D.N.Y.1972)  
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 It therefore follows that the RSO is likely to avoid liability if it has not been informed 
by the company of the potential security incidents that may happen during the 
certification period or of the possible amendments to the ship security plan that could be 
undertaken as a result of the revision of the ship security assessment.110      
 
It is interesting to look at the issue of liability of RSOs with regard to third parties such 
as the cargo owners, especially after a security-related incident causing damage to the 
cargo. In this respect, case law has demonstrated that it is difficult for the cargo owners 
to succeed in a claim in tort against classification Societies, where a deficient survey was 
performed by a class surveyor.111  In general, it should noted that the cases against the 
classification societies have relied on contractual or on tort liability theories. In practice, 
the majority of the claims are filed under the tort spectrum. In addition, it should be 
mentioned that the shipowner may be liable in tort to third parties that sustained damage 
by negligence of independent contractors, if the shipowner is able to control the manner 
in which the work is done by the independent contractors.112   
 
In addition, classification societies may be considered in some jurisdictions as 
government appointees, immunized from liability for issuing statutory certificates in 
good faith, such was the case in the “Sundancer”,113 in which the American Bureau of 
Shipping (ABS) was granted legislative immunity under the Bahamian Shipping Act of 
1976. This policy of exemption is perceived by Honka114 as against the public aims of 
the maritime community, based on ensuring safety, environmental protection and 
                                                 
110 These obligations are clearly stated in the IACS “Procedural Requirements for ISPS Code  
     Certification”, see supra-note 106    
111 The leading authority is the judgment of the House of Lords in “The Nicholas H” [1992] 2  
      Lloyd’s Rep.481 (Q.B.); [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.492 (C.A.); [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.299 (H.L.).   
      In this case the issues of “foreseeability” and “proximity” were considered in relation to the  
      classification society and the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim of the cargo owners upon policy     
      grounds, in  the sense that a favorable judgment for the cargo owners would affect greatly the    
      scheme of  limitation of liability regulated by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.          
112 See Gaskell, Nicholas et al, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts (London, Hong Kong : LLP, 2000), 
      287 
113 See  Sundance Cruises Corp. v American Bureau of Shipping 799 F.Supp.363, 1992 AMC 2946  
    (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff´d, 7 F.3d 1077, 1994 AMC 1(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.ct. 1399 (1994).  
114 See Honka, Hannu , ´ The Classification system and its problems with special reference to the  
     liability of classification societies´ (1994) 19 Tulane Maritime Law Journal 1 
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currently security at sea. Although this immunity has been challenged by a few decisions, 
such as the one of the Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre in “The Elodie II”,115 the 
entrusted classification society with the statutory duties still enjoys a governmental 
protection, as reflected in the recent case cited in Lloyds List, 116  where the Dutch 
Supreme Court contended in its decision related to the case of the river barge “Linda” 
that the Dutch state’s obligation to observe due care when inspecting ships for issuing or 
renewing certificates of seaworthiness do not purport to protect an unlimited group of 
third parties against unforeseeable damage, resulting from the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel, which was not detected during an inspection carried out under the responsibility 
of the state.117   
 
Undoubtedly, the issue of Class liability will be the topic of a continuous debate during 
the following years. Nevertheless, it is believed that, from a public policy perspective, 
holding Class liable for unexplained casualties may encourage the shipowners to 
disregard their obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
Moreover, the courts will be reluctant to impose full liability on Class upon tort 
principles, whilst the shipowner is entitled to limit his liability in accordance with 
relevant international conventions. 118  In addition, some scholars think that a trend 
towards approving the claims of third parties, mainly cargo owners, against the 
classification societies risks undermining the balance of rights and liabilities between 
shipowners and cargo owners regulated by the Hague/Hague/Hague Visby Rules.119 In 
this regard, the CMI supports a limitation of liability scheme for the classification 
societies, not based on ship’s tonnage, due to the fact that the fees charged by the class 
for the services carried out do not depend on the size of the vessel.120  
                                                 
115 The Tribunal de Commerce de Nanterre, 26 Juin 1992, Revue Scapel, 1992, 109, D.M.F.1994,   
     19.In  this case, the court of Appeal confirmed the previous judgment upholding the claim of the  
     purchaser of the vessel, against Bureau Veritas for the prevailing defects of the ship.  
116 See Hill, Helen, ´´When the state is held not liable for survey deficiencies´ (27 July 2005) Lloyd’s  
     List    
117 Ibid. 
118 See Clark, Peter D, ´ An American Admiralty Law Viewpoint on the Changing Role of  
     Classification Societies´ ( 2004) < http://www.navlaw.com/articles/class.htm > ( 20 July 2005) 
119 See supra-note 112, 290 
120 See Chaves, Gilberto, ´ The issue of liability´ (1998) Bimco Review, 114 
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 It follows, therefore, that any company will have to carry out regular internal audits in 
order to detect as early as possible any potential failure in the security system that may 
expose it to liability for a possible damage or loss of the cargo, caused by a security 
incident. One must, however, underline the instrumental role that may be played by the 
flag state in ensuring that the delegated statutory duties pertaining to the implementation 
of the ISPS Code are accomplished by the RSOs in an efficient way. In this respect, 
some flag states such as Hong Kong have already initiated a quality control system, 
based on monitoring the delegated functions, including the ISPS Code duties and 
exercising quality control over the Class Societies surveying ships in their register.  
 
In the same line of discussion, it is to mention that the US Coast Guard has expressed 
recently their intention to audit RSOs, in particular, with regard to the system of 
accreditation in the different countries, since there are for the moment no guidelines, 
pertaining to the criteria upon which an accreditation is granted to an RSO.121      
 
3.4.4 The paper trail of the security system   
 
It was found by the court in the case of ”The Eurasian Dream”, reviewed earlier that the 
safety management system (SMS) onboard was ineffective, due mainly to the previous 
manning incidents, the documentary inconsistencies detected and the deficient policy 
related to supervision and training. These facts had been demonstrated through the 
examination of the paper trail generated by the ISM system in place, including logbook 
extracts, hours of work records and training forms.                             
Since the philosophy of the ISPS Code is based on a documented scheme, including 
record keeping, reporting and internal audit, there are clear indications that the paper trail 
of the ship security system will be under scrutiny by the courts in seaworthiness related 
disputes. Thus, it is of paramount importance to look at the main ingredients of the 
                                                 
121 See ´ USCG to Audit Security Auditors´ (27 July 2005) < http://www.thefreeman.com/local/story-
20050727-32756.html > (20 August 2005)   
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recording scheme, which forms part of the items dealt with in the Ship Security Plan 
(SSP).    
 
It should be emphasized that the onboard and the shore-based personnel, who are 
assigned security matters, including the SSO and the CSO, should have an acceptable 
level of proficiency and knowledge to deal with their responsibilities.122 Added to that, 
the Code stipulates that drills should be conducted at least every three months and 
exercises every calendar year.123 These activities allow testing individual items of the 
ship security plan, including the possible security threats mentioned in the Code in order 
to identify any security-related deficiency and also make the shipboard personnel 
conversant with their security duties at all security levels. The activities of training, drills 
and exercises should be recorded in an electronic format or as entries in the ship log, a 
copy of which should be sent to the CSO responsible for the particular vessel.124      
 
Whilst it is required under the ISPS Code125 to report any arising breach of security, one 
may argue that the related records can be used against the company in a trial, related to 
the seaworthiness of the vessel,126 unless adequate corrective measures were taken out by 
the SSO, in liaison with the CSO and recorded accordingly. In this case, the internal 
audit may be a second defence for the shipowner, if the effectiveness of the remedial 
actions has been assessed and additional measures have been undertaken. 
 
The paper trail generated by the implementation of the security scheme will have an 
impact on the way seaworthiness disputes are litigated in courts. In this respect, the 
recourse to some modern techniques of case management such as the Post Incident 
Auditing, which can be used for seaworthiness disputes with respect to the ISM Code127 
                                                 
122 See sections ISPS/B/13.1-13.3 
123 See section ISPS/B/13.6-13.7  
124 See supra-note 96  
125 See section ISPS/A/10.1.3 
126 Especially, if a breach of security of this kind was the proximate cause of a security related incident. 
127 See Spears, Sandra, ´ Lawyers advocates a new angle on case management in the post ISM world ´   
     (25 May 2005) Lloyd’s List, where the author presented how the  Post Incident Audit could be 
     applied in seaworthiness disputes, with regard to the ISM Code. 
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are likely to assist the case handlers in planning in a timely manner the strategy which 
will be followed in dealing with security related cases. 
 
Basically, the Post Incident Auditing mechanism will consist of a review of the manuals 
related to the ship security plan and all the records kept onboard the vessels, including 
the logs and the checklists. The purpose of this review is the verification of the 
compliance with the security requirements and the detection of non-conformities, 
missing records and conflicts.128This approach will permit the litigator to prepare in a 
structured way the witness-statement taking and to avoid cross examination of 
documentation irrelevant to the dispute. However, the present technique is likely to be 
used in any case involving a high value damage or loss.  
 
3.4.5 The port facility in the equation of seaworthiness 
 
Despite the fact that the security related responsibilities of the Administration and the 
Contracting Government in respect of the ship and the port facility have been laid down 
in a separate sets of regulations, there are areas of interaction between the two sides, in 
particular, with regard to the setting of compatible security levels at the point of 
ship/port interface. In fact, the Administration and the Contracting Government are 
required to establish, as stipulated by the provisions of the ISPS Code, efficient 
procedures in order to ensure security level compatibility in terms of setting the security 
level for the ship and port facility side. However, any failure on the part of the PFSO 
properly to implement these procedures might lead to a non-compliance with the 
security regime on the part of the ship. Such a situation may arise, for example, in case 
of lack of liaison by the PFSO with the SSO and the consequent difficulties that may 
appear in the communication of the different measures that should be taken prior entry 
into the port, especially when it comes to the setting of security levels 2 and 3.Such 
failures will be particularly relevant when leading to a security related incident, causing 
damage or loss of life or property. It is not possible to predict with certainty the way the 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
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courts will rule upon the claims that may arise, but it is of paramount importance to see 
to what extent the claimants can be successful in a dispute involving allegations of 
unseaworthiness and lack of due diligence. 
 
The security scheme provides records of the communications between the ship and the 
port facility, about the arrangements carried out before reaching the point of ship/port 
interface, including the changes of security level that may be performed. Therefore, the 
courts are likely to review the recorded information in order to ascertain whether the 
failure to set compatible security levels is to be assigned to the port facility or to the ship. 
It could be argued that the records kept onboard the ship will not be sufficient per se to 
prove the fault and that additional information from the port facility concerned should be 
provided during the proceedings. It is perhaps uncertain to see that the Contacting 
Government could easily disclose its records in a law suit. Likely, the SSO and possibly 
the CSO have to prove that due diligence had been exercised in ensuring that the security 
level onboard the vessel was compatible with the security status in the port facility. 
 
 It should be emphasized that the discussion about the security level in a port facility 
may extend to other issues related, for example, to charter parties, such as the warranty 
of the safety of the port, particularly in case of a security level 3 prevailing in the port 
facility. Such issues may be subject to negotiation between the parties concerned.  
 
According to the findings of a survey carried out by Bureau Veritas,129 and which were 
presented at a Conference held in Nantes, 130  many of the questioned shipping 
companies expressed the fact that their endeavours to improve shipboard security were 
not followed at the same pace by the ports. Regarding this concern, it is essential to 
highlight that IMO has not yet established a control scheme in respect of security for 
port facilities, as has already been done for ships, through certification and regular 
                                                 
129 See Spurrier, Andrew, ´ Shipowners blast smaller ports over ISPS compliance failures´ (27 June  
      2005) Lloyd’s List  
130 The Conference held in Nantes between 23 and 24 June 2005 intended to evaluate the  
      implementation of the ISPS Code after its first year of being in force.   
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inspection. Therefore, it seems relevant to the present discussion to explore the 
potential impact.    
   
3.4.6 The exculpatory exceptions and the burden of proof 
 
The carrier may extricate himself from liability in case of damage or loss of the cargo 
if the cause of this occurrence is among the catalogue of the 17 exculpatory exceptions 
listed in Art.IV (2) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. What seems to be relevant to our 
discussion is certainly the first immunity related to ´ Act, neglect, or default of the 
master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the 
management of the ship´ stipulated by Art.IV(2) (a). The analysis of the wording of 
this provision will not intend to dwell on the interpretation of the concept of 
management to its whole extent. Suffice is to say that the meaning of the word ´ 
management´ is controversial, in the sense that it is not clear whether a particular act of 
the master or the other servants is related to the management of the ship or the cargo. 
In fact it was held by English law 131  that one should distinguish between the 
management of the cargo alone as stipulated by Art.III (2) and the management of the 
ship as a whole as prescribed in Art.IV (2(a)). 
 
It is recognized that the advent of the ISPS Code, as was the case for the ISM Code 
will have an earth-shaking influence on the validity of Art.4 (2)(a) of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules which have permitted the carrier to avoid liability for error 
in navigation and management. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the extensive 
reporting scheme laid down by the ISPS Code and the effective involvement of the 
company in the management of the security system onboard its ships, via the CSO and 
the SSO will make the immunity related to the error of management redundant. 
 
                                                 
131 The meaning of the word ´ management ´ is controversial, in the sense that it is not clear whether it is 
related to the cargo or to the ship. It was held in Gosse Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant 
Marine [1929] A.C. 726 that it is essential to distinguish between the management of the cargo alone 
(Art.III r.2) and the management of the ship as a whole(Art.IV r.2(a)). 
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It should also be noted that the carrier may be exculpated from liability, even if the loss 
of or the damage to the cargo was a result of the unseawothiness of the vessel, if he 
proves that he exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy according to Art.IV 
(1) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. In other words, the company is required in this 
case to prove through the various kinds of evidence available under the security system, 
including records and reports that he endeavored to apply as properly as possible the 
security requirements. 
 
3.5 Limitation of liability 
 
Generally, a terrorist attack or a security related incident onboard a ship may result in 
potential damage, loss of the cargo, personal injury or death. What should be borne in 
mind first is the fact that the limitation of liability in cargo claims may be governed by 
the global limitation regime (often called tonnage limitation) as well as the specific 
regime for carriage of goods by sea ,132 such as the one stipulated by the Hague/Hague 
Visby Rules.133 The present discussion will deal with limitation of liability for cargo 
claims from a global perspective springing from tort allegations rather than originating 
from contractual arrangements. At the same time, reference will be made to specific 
matters pertaining to the claims related to personal injury and death, which are likely to 
arise after a security related incident on board a ship. In addition, we must underline 
that the purpose of this section is to determine to what extent the company’s non- 
delegable duty to exercise due diligence in making the ship seaworthy may affect the 
conduct barring limitation of liability.  
 
 It is established as a matter of law that the legal basis upon which the company is 
entitled to limit its liability will depend on whether reference will be made to the 
International Convention Relating to the Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea –
Going Ships adopted in Brussels on 10 October 1957 or to the Limitation of Liability of 
                                                 
132 See Chen, Xia, Limitation of Liabilities for Maritime Claims (The Hague, London, Boston :  
     Kluwer Law International, 2001), 35 
133 See Art.4 (5). 
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Maritime Claims (LLMC) Convention adopted in London on 19 November 1976. Whilst 
breaking the limitation of liability under the 1957 Convention is based on proving that 
the sustained loss was caused by the ´actual fault or privity´ of the owner134 , it is based 
under the 1976 LLMC Convention on proving that the loss sustained resulted from the 
personal act or omission of the owner, with the intention to cause the loss and the 
knowledge of its probable occurrence.135  
 
3.5.1 Limitation of liability under the 1957 Convention 
 
The wording ´ actual fault and privity´ has been used interchangeably with other terms 
such as ´ privity and knowledge´,136 to express the behaviour of the shipowner that may 
deprive him from invoking the limitation of liability regime. For the sake of illustrating 
the manner in which the test enunciated above may operate in a security context, it is 
assumed that a company has been held liable of damage caused to a specific cargo, after 
a security related incident. In this regard, it is assumed that it has been found by the court 
that the company failed to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel, under 
the security regime and this is ascertained to be the cause of the incident and thus of the 
sustained damage or loss.137 In this situation, it might be argued that the failure of the 
company to perform its non-delegable duty pertaining to seaworthiness could deprive it 
of limitation of liability. The English courts have attempted in a number of cases to use 
                                                 
134 Art.1(1) of the 1957 Convention states: “ The owner of  a sea-.going ship may limit his liability in 
accordance with Article 3 of this Convention in respect of claims arising from any of the following 
occurrences, unless the occurrence giving rise to the claim resulted from the actual fault or privity of the 
owner”.    
135 See the wording of art.4 of the Convention on limitation of liability for Maritime Claims., 1976. 
136 Considered as the American version of the wording ´ actual fault and privity´. The wording can be    
      found in the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 of the United States.  
137 If there is no causal connection between the ´ actual fault or privity´ and the damage or the loss,  
     shipowners may still be entitled to benefit from the limitation of liability regime. This principle has  
     been reflected trough the decisions of both  English and American courts. It could be referred in  
     this respect  to ´ The Empire Jamaica´ [1955] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.50 PDAD, where it was held by the  
     Admiralty court that the lack of certification of a second officer was not sufficient as such to  
     deprive the shipowner of limitation of liability, because the lack of the certificate was not the  
      cause of the collision which occurred between the ´Empire Jamaica´ and the Dutch motor vessel  
      “Garoet”. 
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the doctrine of the non-delegable duty to deny the right to limitation, 138  but the 
dominating trend in various cases139 has been to examine the two issues separately.  
 
Against that background, the company in the present context is required to show that the 
unseaworthiness of the ship did not originate from its ´privity and knowledge´. The 
question here is to determine whose knowledge will be imputed to that of the company. 
In the previous chapter, we have already looked into the English stream, which considers 
that the knowledge of the ´alter ego´ or what is called ´the directing mind and will´ of the 
company such as the managing director, binds the company.  
 
From this perspective and with reference to the set of responsibilities and duties of the 
CSO under the ISPS Code,140 it does not seem possible to suggest that the CSO is the ´ 
directing mind´ of the company in security matters or even is entitled to have ´ direct 
access´ to the top management. However, the findings of questionnaire carried out on a 
sample of shipping companies reveals that in a considerable number of them, the 
Designated Person (DP) under the ISM Code is the same person as the CSO, which 
permits him to be the liaison between the SSO and the top management. In this case, the 
knowledge of the CSO will be relevant for the limitation purpose, and can amount to the 
knowledge of the company, as he will be directly responsible for supervising the safety, 
the environmental protection and the security matters pertaining to the ship(s) of the 
company, with regular follow-up by the top management, through a reporting scheme. 
This kind of situation within a company appears to be in harmony with the practices 
followed by the Recognized Security organizations, consisting of carrying out the ISPS 
and the ISM Code audits under the same framework.     
 
Whilst the English approach tends to search for the ´directing mind´ of the company 
within the highest level, the American approach has considered that the knowledge of the 
                                                 
138 As cited by Chen, Xia, Limitation of Liabilities for Maritime Claims (The Hague, London,  
     Boston : Kluwer Law International, 2001), 70       
139  See for example “ The Lady Gwendolen” [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.335 CA 
140 Section ISPS/A/11 
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employees of the company vested with supervisory and discretionary powers, such as the 
managing agent, amount to the knowledge of the company itself.141 According to this 
scheme, it will be reasonable to assume that the knowledge of the CSO is likely to 
represent the knowledge of the company, regarding seaworthiness of the vessel, under 
the security regime.  
 
3.5.2 Limitation of liability under the 1976 Convention 
 
Unlike the test of ´actual fault or privity´ found in the 1957 Convention, the test 
enshrined in Art.4 of the LLMC 1976 reduces the chances of the claimants in barring 
limitation of the shipowner. In this respect, it is extremely difficult to prove that the 
damage or the loss was caused by the personal act or omission of the person, with the 
intent to cause the damage or the loss142, or with recklessness and knowledge that the 
damage or the loss was likely to occur,  
 
The determination of the intention of a person needs the exploration of his mind and 
maybe the use of infallible methods of exposing the true intention of the person 
concerned.143 Also, it does not seem reasonable, for example, that the president or board 
of directors within a company would issue an order to the Company Security Officer, 
demanding him to lessen the precautionary measures taken in respect of the control of 
the ship access. It should be borne in mind that, under a structured and documented 
system, such as the ISPS Code, based mainly on regular reporting and internal audit, the 
occurrence of any such formal order would be suspicious. 
 
It is submitted that the security system on board a ship is based on risk analysis 
principles. In fact, the SSO is regularly required to propose to the CSO any possible 
ramification to the SSP, through updating the SSA. Bearing in mind that the SSO is the 
                                                 
141 American Dredging Co. v. Lambert, 81 F.3d 127 (11th Cir. 1996), where the court stated that   
     when a shipowner is a corporation, the privity or knowledge of this corporation is that of its  
     managing agent, officer or supervisory employee.    
142 The intention to cause damage or loss is envisaged more in criminal liability. 
143 See supra-note 7, 407 
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individual the most conversant with the hazards that may endanger the vessel and that all 
the security measures and incidents are recorded, it is unlikely that the top manager 
would turn a blind eye to providing the necessary resources for the CSO and the SSO to 
remedy any arising security deficiencies.    
 
Moreover, the cargo claimants in the context of the scenario presented at the outset of 
this section will have a heavy burden of proof, consisting of proving that the 
inappropriate personal act of the manager of the company was the cause of the damage 
or the loss. It is clear that recourse will be to the discovery and the disclosure144 of the 
relevant documents forming the paper trail of the security regime, discussed earlier in 
this chapter.   
 
 3.6 Relevance of soft law to seaworthiness 
 
 It is a matter of policy of the IMO to issue recommendations and guidelines, if needed 
when a Convention or a Code becomes mandatory. The purpose of this approach is to 
facilitate the implementation of the adopted legal instruments by the member States. 
However, the relevance of the substance of these recommendatory documents to the 
seaworthiness of a ship may be questioned. This concern is justified, at least in the realm 
of maritime security, where it has been witnessed that some States, such as the USA, 
have made the recommendatory part B of the ISPS Code mandatory and enacted it in its 
national legislation via the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002145. 
 
Generally speaking, it has been established by case law that the seaworthiness of a ship 
must be judged by the standards and practices of the industry at the relevant time, at least 
so long as those standards and practices are reasonable. Thus, it might be may argued 
                                                 
144 Whilst disclosure of documents in courts is frequent in common law countries, it is not compulsory   
      in many civil law countries.   
145 The Maritime Transportation Security Act adopted by the USA in 2002 have brought security  
      measures more stringent than the ISPS Code itself and has in this respect made part B of the Code  
      mandatory. The integral text of the act may be found at: 
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/mp/pdf/MTSA.pdf>    
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that the pack of security guidelines issued by IMO146 since the adoption of the ISPS 
Code may be among the factors that should be looked at, when assessing the 
seaworthiness of a vessel under the security spectrum.  
 
Reasonably, the role of the security related guidelines or recommendations may not be 
relevant in a court proceeding for compensation or limitation purposes, unless the cargo 
claimant can show that non-compliance with these soft law instruments was the cause of 
the damage or the loss of his cargo, resulting from a potential security related incident. 
However, the national security requirements established by some countries, particularly 
the USA147 have been taken into account world wide in the trading practices of the 
industry. In this respect, the revised BIMCO ISPS/MTSA clauses for voyage and time 
charter parties148  require the owners, when trading to or from the United States or 
passing through the United States waters to comply with the requirements of the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002, relating to the vessel and the “owner”149 as 
defined by this instrument. 
  
3.7 Issues specific to the Hamburg Rules 
 
As has been seen in the previous chapter, the seaworthiness of the ship has not been 
explicitly cited by the provisions of the Hamburg Rules, but the emphasis was put on the 
condition of the cargo, that should be kept sound during the whole period of time that the 
goods are in the carrier’s custody. If it has been assumed that a security related incident 
happened onboard the vessel, causing extensive damage to the cargo, it might be argued 
that the carrier is liable for the damage unless he proves that he, his servants or his agents 
acted as any prudent owner will act in such circumstances to avoid the incident and its 
consequences.  
                                                 
146 The set of IMO Guidelines and Circulars related to maritime security can be found at:   
    < http://www.imo.org/home.asp> 
147 See supra-note 145  
148  See provision (a) (i) of the revised ISPS/MTSA clauses for both voyage and time charter parties  
      established in June 2005. The text of these clauses can be found on the BIMCO website at: 
       <http://www.bimco.dk/Home/Corporate%20Area/Documents/Clauses.aspx>        
149  See supra-note 145 , chapter 701/ section 70101/4(A)   
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 It must be remembered that, even under Art.3(2) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the 
carrier has a continuous obligation for caring properly for the cargo, which seems 
consistent with the substance of Art.5(1) of the Hamburg Rules, regarding the liability 
for the damage to the cargo.  Moreover, it has been concluded by Bauer 150  after 
analyzing seven samples of UK and US decisions on pre-voyage unseaworthiness under 
the Hague/Hague Visby Rules that they are likely to be decided in the same way under 
the Hamburg Rules. It should be noted that the remainder of the discussion is to be 
mainly centred on the concept of ´due diligence´, in respect of the security matters, 
which enshrines the same substantial meaning either in the context of the Hague/ Hague- 
Visby Rules or the Hamburg Rules.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150 See Bauer, R. G, ´Conflicting Liability Regimes: Hague-Visby v  Hamburg Rules - A Case by  
     Case Analysis´ (1993) 24:1 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 53  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SEAWORTHINESS UNDER THE SECURITY REGIME: 
FROM A MARINE INSURANCE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks: 
 
It has already been mentioned that the undertaking of seaworthiness is relevant in both 
voyage and time policies of insurance. Under English law, it has been seen that section 
39(1)151 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 implies in a voyage policy a warranty of 
seaworthiness at the commencement of the insured voyage and that the breach of this 
warranty would automatically discharge the insurer from liability as from the date of the 
breach.  In respect of a time policy, there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness at any 
stage of the adventure, but the privity of the assured to send an unseaworthy ship to sea, 
would deprive him from the insurance cover, if the damage or the loss is caused by such 
unseaworthiness152. 
 
 Unlike the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1996153, 
does not make any distinction between voyage and time policies in respect of the nature 
of the undertaking of seaworthiness, but imposes on the assured the obligation to rectify 
any detected deficiency of the ship before or after the commencement of the voyage. In 
other words, the liability of the insurer for coverage of the damage or the loss related to 
the unseaworthiness of the ship depends on the moment the defects are detected and on 
the corrective actions taken by the assured154.  
 
It should be borne in mind that compliance with the requirements of the security regime 
is not conclusive evidence of the seaworthiness of the ship in respect of the relevant 
                                                 
151 See supra- note 50. 
152 See supra- note 52. 
153 See supra- note 62. 
154 See supra- note 63. 
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undertaking of seaworthiness laid down in the provisions of voyage and time policies. 
Nevertheless, a vessel non- compliant with the security requirements is likely to be 
considered unseaworthy from a marine insurance perspective. What is of particular 
interest in the present discussion is to determine the standard of seaworthiness expected 
from the insurer and the way a company as defined in the ISPS Code may ensure that its 
ships have onboard a security system able to reach this standard. The examination of the 
nature and the legal effects of breach of the undertaking of seaworthiness will be made 
with reference to the English and Norwegian Laws on the subject matter.            
 
4.2 Undertaking of seaworthiness under the MIA 1906 
 
4.2.1 Voyage policy 
 
At the outset, it should be mentioned that time policies are commonly used for 
insurance on ships, since voyage policies are inappropriate in the case of vessels which 
are not habitually employed in single voyages.155 However, it is worth to examine the 
applicability and the legal effects of breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness 
stipulated by section 39(1) of the MIA 1906, under the spectrum of the ISPS Code and 
the relevant amendments to the SOLAS Convention 1974.  
The warranty of seaworthiness as enunciated by section 39(1) is absolute and thus it is 
not sufficient for the shipowners merely to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel as it is envisaged by Art.III (1) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
Consequently, it will make it easier for the insurer to be released from liability in case 
of a damage or loss attributable to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. In this context, 
the company as defined in the ISPS code is required at the commencement of the 
voyage to comply with all the ingredients of the security regime as listed in the 
previous chapter, including trained personnel, adequate equipment and valid 
documentation. Obviously, the issue which deserves to be examined in this respect is 
                                                 
155 See Rose, Francis D., Marine Insurance: Law and Practice (London, Singapore:  LLP, 2004) 187  
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the way through which the insurer can ascertain that the ship is operationally compliant 
with the security regime. For the sake of illustrating the practices followed by the 
insurance market prior to the inception of any voyage policy, it might be useful to refer 
to the sphere of cargo insurance, where voyage policies predominate in practice.156  
It should be noted that the Institute Cargo Clauses (ICC) 1982, published by the 
Institute of London Underwriters have gained international currency in the markets of 
insurance on cargo157. According to clause 5.2 of these standard policies, the breach of 
the implied warranty of seaworthiness and fitness is waived unless the cargo owner or 
his servants are privy to the unseaworthiness or the unfitness of the vessel at the time 
of loading. 158 In other words, the cargo owner may loose his insurance cover if he was, 
or ought to have been aware at the time of loading of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. 
It could be said that this provision may in some circumstances constitute a prejudice to 
the rights of innocent assureds, who have to prove that they were not privy to the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel, through strenuous court proceedings.          
In order to deal with such a controversial issue and at the same time to respond to the 
needs of the contemporary mandatory IMO regulations, in particular the ISM Code, the 
London insurance market published a few endorsement clauses, such as the ISM Code 
Endorsement Clause applicable to shipments on board vessels to which the ISM Code 
applies.159  It should be noted that this Clause has a twofold purpose. First, it has been 
established to reinforce the implementation of the ISM Code from its inception and 
secondly, it has aimed to protect innocent cargo assureds through ensuring that they 
were not prejudiced by shipments on a non-certified vessel.160 In principle, the Cargo 
ISM Endorsement Clause intends to release the insurer from liability for the loss of or 
                                                 
156 See Thomas, D.Rhidian (ed), The Modern Law of Marine Insurance (London, New York, Hong  
Kong: LLP, 2002), 15        
157 See Hodges, Susan, Cases and Materials on Marine Insurance Law ( London, Sydney : Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd, 2000), 878-888. For a global survey of the clauses, see Hudson, N, G & Allen, J, C, The 
Institute Clauses, 3rd Ed (London: LLP, 1999).        
158 Ibid, 878, 883, 888. 
159  It was prepared on 01 May 1998 by the joint cargo committee , which was formed of underwriters  in 
both the Lloyd’s and company markets. It came into effect on 01 July 1998.      
160 See Felsted, Andrea, ´ New ISM Code endorsement clause´ (13 May 1998)  Lloyd’s List    
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the damage to the cargo carried on board a vessel failing to comply with the ISM Code. 
The exclusion will operate if at the time of loading the cargo, the assured was aware, or 
in the ordinary course of business, should have been aware that the vessel was not 
certified in accordance with the ISM Code or that its owners or operators did not hold a 
Document of Compliance.161 However, the exclusion does not apply to a bona fide 
third party to whom the insurance was assigned.  
It has been argued that the rationale behind the establishment of the ISM Endorsement 
Clause was to provide the insurance industry with a tool that may reduce the potential 
number of claims that may arise out of allegations of unseaworhiness resulting from 
the non-compliance of the assureds with the ISM requirements. It could be concluded 
from the preceding discussion that the seaworthiness of a vessel in the context of the 
ISM Code is evaluated from an insurance point of view on the availability of an ISM 
certificate or a document of compliance. From this perspective, the effectiveness of the 
safety management system on board a ship remains questionable and will not be 
subject of scrutiny unless loss of or damage to the cargo occurs.  
Against this background, it would seem, as a matter of analogy that the insurance 
market is likely to use in the context of the security regime the same line of reasoning 
followed when dealing with the ISM Code. In other words, it could be argued that an 
ISPS endorsement clause is likely to be established in an attempt to cope with the 
potential disputes that may take place between insurers and assureds out of the 
implementation of the requirements of the security regime. However, it is not possible 
to predict with certainty which approach the insurance market will follow in this 
respect. In order to illustrate some of the challenges that may face the cargo insurers in 
practice, a hypothetical scenario will be thoroughly analysed.  
                                                 
161 See Tilleke & Gibbins, ´ Impact of the ISM Code on the Marine Insurance Market´  (September  
1998) 
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The present scenario concerns a shipment of a cargo of bananas from a port in Central 
America to a port in Europe. The shipment is insured under the Institute Cargo Clause 
(A). 162  Prior to the ship’s entry into the European port, the master submitts the 
information required by the provisions of the ISPS Code to the officers duly authorized 
for this purpose. After evaluation of the data by the competent port officers, the vessel 
is directed into a waiting area adjacent to the port, where it is later found that it does 
not hold a valid ISSC. Subsequently, a Declaration of Security163 is completed by the 
port facility and the ship, which was is not allowed to discharge its cargo before 
obtaining a valid ISSC. In this situation, the cargo owner suffers a loss caused by the 
delay in delivery of the cargo. Undoubtedly, it might be relevant to see whether the 
cost of such delay would be covered by the insurer.  
First, it is reasonable to qualify the ship as unseaworthy due to the lack of the ISSC. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that as a matter of English law a ship may not be able 
to tender a notice of readiness, unless it is ready physically as well as legally to load or 
discharge.164 In fact, it has been held by English case law that a vessel needs to acquire 
the necessary clearances, before being able to tender a notice of readiness, except if 
these clearances are believed to be just mere formalities as has been demonstrated in 
“The Delian Spirit”.165  
It should be noted that the loss sustained by the cargo owner was proximately caused 
by the delay at the port. Bearing in mind that clause 4.5 of the Institute cargo policy 
does not cover any damage, loss or expense attributable to delay, even though the 
delay is caused by a risk insured against,166 the cargo owner would not be entitled to an 
insurance cover for his economical loss. However, in a law suit against the carrier, the 
court is likely to uphold the claim of the cargo owner, providing that the carriage is 
governed by the provisions of the Hamburg rules or by any national instrument, 
                                                 
162 See, supra- note 157, 877-881.   
163 See ISPS/A/5. 
164 See Cooke, Julian et al, Voyage Charters, 2nd ed  (London : LLP, 2001), 345  
165 See Shipping Developments Corporation v.  V/O Sojuzneftexport [1972] 1 Q.B. 103  
166 See , supra-note 157 at p.877 
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incorporating the loss caused by delay of the cargo. In fact, it could be fairly said that 
the lack of a valid ISSC proves to a great extent that the carrier, his servants or agents 
did not take all the measures to avoid the occurrence which caused the delay.  
It is evident that the implications of a situation such as the one depicted through the 
present scenario should be addressed by the insurance market, in particular in case of 
transfer of the ownership of the cargo and assignment of the insurance contract to a 
third party, which is in fact a common practice in the sphere of shipping. In this respect, 
it is interesting to look at the way in which the insurance market has dealt with similar 
situations in the context of the ISM Code.  
It is crucial to point out that the Cargo ISM Forwarding Charges Clause 167  was 
established by the Institute of London Underwriters to deal with cases involving ships 
which have been subject to arrest, detention or deviation, as a result of law 
enforcement measures for non-compliance with the ISM Code. The philosophy behind 
this Clause is to cover the additional expenses incurred by the cargo owner, including 
loading, storing and forwarding the cargo to its intended destination, in case of its 
release from the ship. 
Although, some surveys related to the implementation of the ISPS Code, in particular, 
in European ports,168 reveal that there have been only very few cases of detention of 
ships for failure to provide a valid ISSC, the establishment of a ´Cargo ISPS 
Forwarding Charges Clause´ would be likely to reduce the economical losses of the 
cargo owners in case of detention of the vessel in ports for non-compliance with the 
requirements of the security regime.  Despite the additional premium which would be 
incurred by the cargo owners, the use of such a clause by the insurance market might 
cover other situations that could arise out of the enforcement of the security provisions, 
in particular, the denial from entry to ports or the expulsion from ports.  
                                                 
167 See, supra-note 161 
168 See ´ Survey on implementation of the ISPS Code/EU Regulation in EU ports` < 
http://www.espo.be/policy/position%202005/FINAL%20summary%208%20March%202005.pdf> (12 
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Last but not least, it should be added that the warranty of seaworthiness is a condition 
precedent to the liability of the insurer.169 In other terms, if the assured (shipowner) 
was proved to be non-compliant with the requirements of the security regime, any 
subsequent loss, even though not caused by this non-compliance will not be covered by 
the insurer. 
4.2.2 Time policy 
The remit of this section is to examine the effect of the security regime on the defence 
of unseaworthiness and privity, afforded to an insurer in a time policy by virtue of 
section 39(5) of the MIA 1906. Basically, before an insurer can avoid liability, the 
insurer has to establish first, that the vessel is unseaworthy, then to prove that the 
assured was privy to the unseaworthiness, to which the damage or the loss was 
attributable.  
With regard to the first line of inquiry, it is noteworthy that the seaworthiness of a ship 
under the security regime for the purpose of indemnity in insurance encompasses the 
same legal meaning discussed in the previous chapter. Although the wording of section 
39(4) of the MIA merely states that a ship is seaworthy, when it is reasonably fit in all 
respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured, the 
reasonable test, pertaining to the attitude of a prudent owner prevails when assessing 
the status of seaworthiness of a vessel before sending it to sea. Therefore, the present 
discussion will put more emphasis on the procedural mechanism through which the 
insurer may establish that a vessel is unseaworthy. 
 It is a matter of fact that the reporting scheme encapsulated in the ISPS Code is 
undoubtedly of paramount importance when it comes to the issue of evidential proof in 
respect of the status of seaworthiness of the vessel within the realm of marine 
insurance. In this regard, it might be useful to refer to some standard time policies, 
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such as International Hull Clauses (IHC), which have been published by the Joint Hull 
Committee in November 2003.170 It should be noted that these clauses may permit the 
underwriters in some circumstances to exonerate themselves from liability, without the 
need to rely on section 39(5) of the MIA. This specific feature will be demonstrated 
through the analysis of the relevant provisions of the abovementioned clauses.  
Pursuant to clause 13.1.3 of the IHC, the owner is required to give effect without 
undue delay to any recommendation or restriction issued by the classification society, 
pertaining to the seaworthiness of the vessel. Whilst in most cases the vessel’s 
classification society assumes at the same time the duties of the vessel’s RSO, and 
bearing in mind that a security related deficiency may impinge on the seaworthiness of 
the vessel as was seen, it could be reasonably said that duty of the owner under clause 
13.1.3 may be extended to the security related recommendations of RSOs. However, 
the applicability of this extension should be cautiously assessed in view of the specific 
international context within which the ISPS Code was adopted. The Code is not likely 
to be dealt with from an insurance perspective in the same way as the ISM Code, for 
example, which is covered by the provisions of the IHC. 
It is essential to note that according to clause 14.4.2 of the IHC (2003), the 
underwriters can be released from liability for any loss or damage caused by an 
unreported defect in the vessel. Assuming that the security leg is part of the ingredients 
of seaworthiness as defined by the IHC (2003), clause 14.4.2 may apply with regard to 
the reporting of security deficiencies. In fact, this is in line with the procedural 
requirements for ISPS Code certification171, which require the company to inform the 
RSO of any arising security incidents or the possible amendments to the SSP, resulting 
from the revision of the SSA. The issue which springs to mind is the fact that the SSO 
may find that a minor security defect need not be reported to the RSO. This attitude in 
itself is a breach of clause 14.4.2, but the loss of the insurance cover by the company is 
                                                 
170 These clauses cover hull and machinery losses. It is the second version of the International Hull  
Clauses issued on 01 November 2002, which are intended to replace the Institute Time Clauses of 01 
October 1983 and 01 November 1995.  
171 See supra-note 106. 
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to be raised, in particular, if this supposed minor deficiency caused a security incident, 
resulting in damage to or loss to the hull and machinery.        
What should also be pointed out is that the qualification of a deficiency as minor is left 
to the professional judgment of the SSO and possibly the CSO. Whilst the 
underestimation of a security deficiency by these officials may impinge on the 
seaworthiness of the ship and engender subsequently a failure of the security 
mechanism to prevent, in particular, a terrorist attack, the loss of insurance cover will 
be incurred by the company as a whole. In fact, the disclosure of the paper trail 
provided by the ISPS Code will permit the underwriter to look into the records related 
to the deficiencies and the breaches of security, which occurred onboard the ship.  
It is to be borne in mind that the insurance cover of a loss or a damage incurred by 
third parties such as cargo owners, crew or passengers should not be seen in isolation 
in the context of the present discussion. In other words, throughout a time policy, the 
insurance of the cargo, in particular, is governed generally by the provisions of a 
voyage policy. In this respect, the contracting parties use common standard voyage 
policy contracts such as the ICC, already mentioned in the previous section. Moreover, 
it is to be noted that, rarely are voyage policies used for insurance of hull and 
machinery except, for instance, on a last voyage or tow to a scrap yard. With regard to 
cover related to loss of life or injuries, it is essential to explore the possibilities that 
may be afforded by the P&I clubs in this regard.      
Against this background, it is evident that during the same voyage, the insurance cover 
pertaining to the hull and machinery, the cargo and the crew or passengers are 
governed by different schemes. It is interesting to explore where the seaworthiness 
issue, which is the subject matter of this dissertation fits in, when it comes to the 
application of these schemes. In order to illuminate some of the issues that may arise in 
such situations, the study of a hypothetical scenario will be carried out. 
If it is assumed that a car carrier is subject to a bombing, a few moments after loading 
its cargo from port A destined to port B. The explosion leads to a total loss of the ship 
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and its cargo. Moreover, some members of the crew are killed, whereas others are 
seriously injured. The investigation that follows revealed that the explosives used in 
this bombing were put inside the bridge and that the log book designed for accessing 
the ship via the gangway did not seem to include any abnormalities. It should be noted 
that the ship is insured under the IHC (2003), whereas the cargo is insured under the 
ICC (A) (1995). 
With respect to the cargo, it is not easy to ascertain whether the explosion was a result 
of the failure of the security system onboard to control the access to the ship, which 
can amount to the unseaworthiness of the vessel at the commencement of the voyage. 
If it is assumed so, the cargo owner may be entitled to the insurance cover under the 
policy, unless he is privy to this unseaworthiness. In practice, the cargo can be sold 
even when the ship is at sea, which does not permit the cargo owner to check the status 
of the ship. However, what seems to be possible is to ensure that the ship holds a valid 
ISSC. One could argue that the ISSC is not conclusive evidence of the seaworthiness 
of the vessel, but in view of the practices of the industry, it needs to be mentioned that 
the establishment of an ISPS Endorsement Clause as already indicated will be useful in 
terms of facing claims for loss or damage due to security related incidents.         
With regard to the issue of loss of life and injury raised in the scenario, it should be 
borne in mind that the realm of ´individual claims´ in general has not yet reached a 
status of uniformity, but it is still a complex patchwork of legislation and common law 
principles. 172  In addition, it should be noted that the liability of the company to 
compensate the crew springs from contractual obligations, and not uniquely from a 
potential negligence in case of failure of the company to provide a seaworthy ship in 
all respects, including compliance with the security requirements. In practice, the loss 
of life or personal injuries incurred by the crew is to be covered by the P& I Clubs. 
However, the company may loose its P&I Club cover in case of sending, with 
knowledge, the ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition. In fact, entry in a P& I club is 
                                                 
172 See Gold, Edgar, Gard Handbook on P&I Insurance, 5th ed (Arendal, Norway :  
     Assuranceforeningen Gard, 2002), 229   
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regarded as a time policy, which is subsequently subject to section 39(5) of the MIA 
1906.173 In this respect, it is to note that P&I Clubs have mainly relied over their 
existence on classification societies in ascertaining that the ships of its members are 
complying with the relevant standards. However, the Clubs have experienced a long 
period of discrepancy between what classification societies contend to consider 
acceptable standards of seaworthiness of a ship and the stark reality of what is in effect 
quite rotten tonnage.174    
In respect of the hull and machinery, there are two issues that should be clarified.  First, 
as the IHC (2003) is subject to English law, the vessel should not be sent to sea in an 
unseaworthy condition with the privity of the assured as stipulated by section 39(5) of 
the MIA 1906. Secondly, the vessel should comply with clause 13 of the IHC (2003) 
related to the classification of the vessel and ISM Code. Also, it is to be recalled that 
clause 13 of the IHC (2003) may be extended to include the security regime 
requirements. From this perspective, if the car carrier in the abovementioned scenario 
was proved to be unseaworthy in terms of the security system on board, the 
underwriters will have the possibility to exculpate themselves from liability, if they can 
prove that the company was privy to such unseaworthiness. Despite the fact that the 
concept of ´privity´ has been discussed earlier, it is essential to point out that the literal 
interpretation of section 39(5) of the MIA 1906 reveals that the act of privity is much 
related to the person in the company who is involved in the decision making process of 
sending ships to sea. In view of the structure of most shipping companies, it is in 
practice the superintendent who is assigned the responsibilities pertaining to the 
supervision and the monitoring of the operation of the fleet. On the assumption that the 
CSO is the same person as the DP under the ISM Code175, it is clear that prior to 
sending a ship to sea, the superintendent shall consult with the CSO, with respect to its 
condition pertaining to safety, environmental protection and security. In order to 
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60 
determine to what extent the privity of the company related to sending an unseaworthy 
ship to sea may be imputed to the CSO, the SSP shall include provisions, which 
indentify to what extent the CSO is entitled to have access to the top management of 
the company.      
Added to what has been said so far, it could be argued that the insurance cover of the 
potential losses that may be attributable to security breaches onboard the vessel, may 
be found under the cover provided under the Institute War and Strikes Clauses176 
(Hull-Time) published by the Institute of London Underwriters on 01 November 1995. 
In this respect, it should be noted that clause 1.5 stipulates that a loss or damage to the 
vessel caused by any terrorist or any person acting maliciously or from a political 
move is covered by the policy. It is beyond the scope of this section to enter into a 
discussion on the concept of ´a malicious act´, but suffice it to say that the War and 
Strikes Clauses are not to be used uniquely for deterring the threats coming from 
pirates, for example, but could generally be applied in case of failure of the security 
system to prevent a politically motivated terrorist attack, the implications of which are 
more far-reaching.177     
It is to note that clause 2.2.4 of IHC (2003) covers the negligence of repairers, or 
charterers provided that the damage or the loss incurred has not resulted from the want 
of due diligence of the assured, owners or managers. However, it is not possible to 
predict with certainty whether the scope of this clause could be extended to cover the 
negligence of the RSOs in carrying out their security services.             
4.3 Undertaking of seaworthiness under the NMIP 1996 
It is beyond the scope of this section to provide a detailed background to the 
Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 1996, but it is useful to present succinctly some 
specific features of this instrument, the advent of which was a landmark event both in 
Norwegian and in Nordic marine insurance law. 
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On 01 January 1997, this instrument superseded the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan 
1964. It is worth noting that the revision of the latter was motivated by, among other 
things, the following elements. First, it was necessary to bring the NMIP 1964 in line 
with the provisions of the Insurance Contracts Act (ICA) of 1989.178 Second, there 
were some separate conditions for hull insurance that had been drafted and published 
on a regular basis as agreed documents, such as those related to the Norwegian P& I 
club insurers.179   
Manifestly, the starting point of any discussion about the undertaking of seaworthiness 
as conceived by the NMIP 1996 is section 3-22 of chapter III, which releases the 
insurer from any liability for loss that is caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel, 
provided that the assured knew or ought to have known of the deficiencies of the vessel 
at time, when it would have been possible for him to intervene. However, this principle 
is not applied in case of nautical faults committed by the master or a member of his 
crew.   
In order to determine the manner in which the substance of section 3-22 can be applied 
in the context of the security regime, the main terms of the whole section need to be 
thoroughly analyzed. 
4.3.1 Unseaworthiness in the context of the NMIP 1996 
Since the NMIP 1996 does not provide any definition of unseaworthiness, it is 
important to define how the unseaworthiness of a ship is perceived by the Norwegian 
legal circles. In this respect, it should be noted first that the standard of seaworthiness 
is benchmarked against the attitude of a prudent owner to send a ship to sea , bearing in 
mind the potential risks that may be faced during the intended adventure. In other 
                                                 
178 This act had superseded the Insurance Contracts Act (ICA) 1930, which was prepared in close 
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words, a deficiency of the ship constitutes unseaworthiness, if it creates a greater risk 
than normal for the operation in question.180  
In addition, the seaworthiness issue in Norway is a matter of government control in the 
sense that the Norwegian maritime authorities supervise the seaworthiness of merchant 
ships, pursuant to the Act of Seaworthiness established on 09 June 1903.This Act, 
which has been amended on a number of occasions, in particular following Norway’s 
ratification of international conventions pertaining to safety at sea, has been under 
scrutiny of a government committee in order to propose a new Act based on modern 
supervisory principles.181 From this perspective, if the maritime authorities have found, 
through inspection, that a ship is seaworthy, one might argue that this finding is to be 
decisive with regard to section 3-22 of the NMIP 1996.  
In principle, section 3-14 of the NMIP 1996 provides that a ship should be classed with 
a classification society approved by the insurer. Even tough the Norwegian insurance 
market has not issued guidelines on the approval by classification societies, the 
statistics in practice reveal that the majority of the ocean hull insurance policies cover 
ships classed with members of IACS, in particular DNV, Lloyd’s Register and ABS.182 
Bearing in mind that these classification societies carry out the security duties as part 
of their tasks, it is logical to consider that a vast majority of ships insured under the 
NMIP 1996 is likely to hold an ISSC and comply in general with the other formal 
security requirements. In addition, it is worth mentioning that the insurance may 
terminate, once a loss of class or a change of classification society takes place. In this 
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regard, the Norwegian insurers have been reluctant to grant their consent to the change 
of classification societies, even between members of IACS.183  
It could be added that the safety regulations provision prescribed by section 3-24 of the 
NMIP 1996 provides another tool for the insurer to ensure that the assured will comply 
with the national and the international regulations, including the ISPS Code 
requirements, which fall within the scope of the definition of a safety regulation.184 
However, it should be borne in mind that seaworthiness is not merely synonymous to 
the observance of the safety regulations, but the breach of a safety regulation may lead 
to the ship not being seaworthy.185   
In the light of these considerations, it could be said that the unseaworthiness of a ship 
as mentioned in section 3-22 should be particularly examined, with respect to the 
security related deficiencies that may arise between inspections and those which are 
not discovered during inspections. Regarding the first type of deficiencies, it is to be 
recalled that the ISPS Code certification is not conclusive evidence of the 
seaworthiness of a ship. According to the Procedural Requirements for ISPS Code 
Certification issued by IACS, it has been seen that the company is required to report to 
the RSO any arising security related deficiency as well as the amendments to the SSP, 
emerging from the revision of the SSA. What should be underscored here is certainly 
that the mechanism of reporting and recording upon which the security regime is based 
is not in favor of any company, which ignores arising security defects.  
In order to define accurately the context of the present discussion, it will be assumed 
that a deficiency regarding the control of the restricted areas arises on board the vessel, 
after the vessel being ISPS certified. In this situation, one may ask whether the SSO 
will proceed to a revision of the SSA, and consequently propose amendments to the 
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SSP. This question will be particularly relevant, in case of a damage or loss caused by 
the detected definciency. However, the company may deny any causal link between the 
defect and the casualty which has occurred. In fact, unlike the position in English Law, 
sections 2-11 and 2-12 of the NMIP 1996 prescribe that there should be a causation 
between the unseaworthiness and the casualty, which generated the loss. 
4.3.2 Privity under the NMIP 1996 
Whilst under section 39(5) of the MIA 1906, the factor of time has no relevance with 
respect to the privity of the assured to the unseaworthiness of the vessel for the purpose 
of the insurance cover of any loss caused by such unseaworthiness, section 3-22 of the 
NMIP 1996 provides that the privity of the assured to the unseaworthiness of the vessel 
may not be sufficient for the insurer to exculpate himself from liability, unless such 
privity has been acquired at a point in time, where it was possible for the assured to 
rectify the arising deficiencies, amounting to the unseaworthiness of the ship.  
From this perspective, it should be mentioned that during a specific voyage, any defect 
detected can easily be reported to the shore based management, through the various 
sophisticated communication facilities available onboard. Particularly, with regard to 
security deficiencies, the communication between the SSO and the CSO is to be 
reliable. Otherwise, there may be circumstances, where the SSO will know about the 
deficiencies at an early stage, but his corrective actions will not be sufficient to prevent 
the occurrence of a security related casualty, for lack of coordination with the CSO. 
For the purpose of applicability of section 3-22 of the NMIP 1996, the privity element 
is not as simple as depicted above through the knowledge of the SSO, but the rules of 
identification186 as seen earlier are to be applied when determining whose knowledge is 
imputed to the knowledge of the company.   
 
                                                 
186 In the present context, these rules aim to determine whose knowledge in a corporate organization  
     could be identified as representing the knowledge of the corporate.  
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4.4 Conflict of laws in marine insurance 
At the outset, it should be noted that the discussion about the conflict of laws with 
regard to the nature and the legal effects of the undertaking of seaworthiness in marine 
insurance should be dealt with under a general framework, and not specifically in the 
context of the security regime. One must bear in mind, however, that conflicts of laws 
relating to marine insurance occur less frequently than in some other areas of contract 
law due to the international influence of some national statutes, such as the MIA 1906 
and the French Code des Assurances, on the relevant national laws in other 
countries.187   
From this perspective, the present discussion seeks to shed light on the attempts that 
have already been made in order to achieve international harmonization of the law of 
marine insurance and to look at the methodology used to solve choice of law problems, 
pertaining to a marine policy. 
First, it is useful to refer particularly to the International Working Group (IWG) set up 
by the Comite´ Maritime International (CMI), with the mission to find out whether 
there is a chance to harmonize the rules of marine insurance.188 In respect of the issue 
of seaworthiness, it has been found that, even tough the common law systems apply the 
concept of warranty, they meet with the civil system concerning some issues such as 
classification societies.189 In practice, it has been witnessed from the experience of 
civil law systems that the insurance market may function without recourse to the use of 
warranties, as long as the duty of disclosure provides adequate protection for the 
insurer. It could be said that the major problem facing the international harmonization 
of the rules of marine insurance is embedded in how to deal with the existing 
mandatory regulations, in particular those used in common law systems.  
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Pending harmonization within the sphere of marine insurance, it is essential to use 
uniform conflicts of law methodologies, in order to make it easier for the courts to 
decide upon the choice of the law applicable to a marine policy. It has been seen earlier 
that the Rome Convention,190 covering the European countries has been a leading 
instrument in this respect, and which provided a set of standards methods for 
determining the proper law of a contract, such as the ´the closest and the most real 
connection´ rule that is commonly used in this area of conflict of laws.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The present dissertation has intended to determine the impact of the security regime 
enshrined in the ISPS Code and the relevant amendments to SOLAS Convention, 1974 
on the doctrine of seaworthiness. Efforts have been made in terms of identifying in the 
context of the security regime the main challenges facing the applicability of the 
undertaking of seaworthiness, which is an instrumental ingredient in the performance 
of some contractual arrangements such as charter parties and marine insurance policies. 
In addition, an analytical approach has been used in order to determine the manner in 
which the existing provisions governing the undertaking of seaworthiness, in particular 
in marine insurance, may be reviewed to accommodate the realities of the security 
regime.                          
It could be concluded from the review of English case law, which has been undertaken, 
that seaworthiness is a momentary concept. In other words, the standards of 
seaworthiness may vary according to the practices of the industry at the relevant time. 
In this respect, reference has been made, in particular, to the recent case of the 
“Eurasian Dream”, in which the court has ruled upon matters pertaining to    
allegations of unseaworthiness and due diligence, having the philosophy of the ISM 
Code in mind.  
Therefore, the courts are likely to pay credence to the security requirements, when it 
comes to allegations of unsearworhiness and due diligence, arising out of a security 
incident causing damage or loss. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that 
compliance with such requirements is not conclusive evidence of seaworthiness.  
With respect to the duty of due diligence in providing a seaworthy ship as per art.III(1) 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the company is required to put more effort into the 
performance of the SSA and avoid relying on an “off the shelf” SSP. The choice of a 
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generic SSP may not be a practical solution towards properly addressing the actual 
security related hazards to a ship. Added to that, the development of an in-house SSP is 
likely to enable the company to produce user-friendly manuals for the implementation 
of the security procedures.  
In dealing with seaworthiness of a ship under the security regime, consideration is to 
be given to the interaction between the ship and the port facility in terms of the 
compatibility of the security levels of both sides. The lack of liaison by the PFSO with 
the SSO may lead to the failure of the ship to adapt its security level to the security 
level prevailing in the port facility. The analysis of this discrepancy and possibly others 
should be carried out under the global framework pertaining to the administrative and 
operational duties of port facilities as prescribed by the ISPS Code. In view of the 
situation in practice, regarding the implementation of the Code, IMO should set a 
mechanism for monitoring the compliance of port facilities, as has already been done 
for ships through certification and regular inspection. 
Since ISPS certification is mostly carried out by RSOs, the mechanism related to the 
accreditation of the status of a RSO should be put under scrutiny, particularly by flag 
states through the development of concise guidelines in respect of the criteria of 
accreditation in order to avoid a situation of patchwork quilt services. Moreover, as 
most RSOs are members of IACS, flag states relying upon the services of these 
classification societies should seek to set in place a quality control scheme as 
established by some flags such as Singapore. Undoubtedly, such a system is likely to 
assist flag states in monitoring the performance of the classification societies surveying 
the ships on their registers.       
In case of damage or loss arising out of a security related incident, caused by 
substantive deficiencies detected onboard an ISPS certificated ship, the issue of 
liability of the RSO may be highlighted. This sensitive issue, which has been subject of 
controversial debates within legal circles, is not specific to the realm of the security 
regime, but it is embedded under the general framework of liability of classification 
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societies. Based on the review of case law in the subject matter, it has been seen that 
the courts have not only been reluctant to hold Class liable in disputes related to 
allegations in tort, but the Class has in some instances been granted legislative 
immunity when issuing statutory certificates on behalf of the government. One must 
underscore the decision of the court in the recent tort related case of “Linda”, which 
has reflected the immunity enjoyed by the Class when performing statutory duties. 
 As there have yet to be any ISPS related cases, it is not possible to determine with 
certainty the position of the courts, when it comes to tort claims against the RSOs, filed 
after potential security incidents. However, since most of the RSOs are mainly IACS 
members, carrying out the ISPS certification as part of their statutory services, the 
RSOs are likely to avoid liability in terms of tort claims. It follows, that particular 
emphasis should be placed on the supervision of the manner in which the security 
services are performed by the RSOs.  
In respect of the exculpatory exceptions afforded to the carrier under Art.IV (2) of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, suffice it to say that the defence related to the error in 
management is considered redundant in the context of the ISPS Code, in view of the 
managerial structure upon which the SSP is based. 
With regard to limitation of liability, whatever the legal framework referred to, either 
the 1957 Convention or the 1976 Convention, it could be said that the security regime 
has no substantial implications on the regimes of limitation laid down by both 
Convention as such. Nevertheless, in terms of identification of the knowledge of the 
company for limitation purposes the following points are to be highlighted: 
• Despite the fact that the questionnaire undertaken for the sake of this 
dissertation reveals that in a considerable number of shipping companies the 
positions of the CSO and the DP under the ISM Code overlap, the status of the 
CSO within the company should be clarified, in particular regarding the degree 
of access to the top management  
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• It is highly recommended to carry out a thorough study on the status and duties 
of the CSO in shipping companies, in order to determine the practices of the 
industry in this respect. Such a study will also intend to determine how the 
security-related information is handled by the CSO and whether all this 
information is reported to the top management.       
• The degree of access of the CSO to the top management should be reflected in 
the provisions of the ISPS Code, as it has been done for the DP under the ISM 
Code; 
• On the assumption that the CSO is the same person as the DP, the knowledge 
of the CSO is likely to amount to the knowledge of the company, at least from 
an American legal point of view. In such a situation, the knowledge of the CSO 
is likely to amount to the knowledge of the company with respect to the ´actual 
fault and privity´ standard enunciated by the 1957 Convention as well as with 
respect to the ´ personal act…` standard enunciated by the 1976 Convention.      
It should be noted that the relevance of the recommendatory instruments issued by 
IMO regarding the implementation of the ISPS Code are likely to be taken into 
consideration by the courts when assessing the seaworthiness of a ship under the 
security regime. The justification of this holding lies, in particular in the recognition of 
the market of the stringent requirements imposed on some trades, as reflected in the 
ISPS/MTSA Clause issued recently by BIMCO, which requires the ships calling US 
ports to comply with the MTSA 2000 provisions.   
Based on the discussion about the undertaking of seaworthiness in the context of 
marine insurance, the following conclusions could be drawn: 
• Despite the fact that section 39(1) of the MIA 1906 implies a warranty of 
seaworthiness in a voyage policy at the beginning of the voyage, in practice this 
warranty is waived, as in cargo insurance, unless the cargo owner is privy to the 
unseaworthiness of the ship. In order to ensure protection for innocent assureds, 
an ISPS Endorsement Clause may be worthy considering.    
71 
•  Whereas the MIA 1906 does not take into account the point of time a defect is 
detected onboard a vessel, the NMIP 1996 adopts a flexible approach, in the 
sense that the assured could still benefit from an insurance coverage in case of a 
damage or loss caused by unseaworthiness, providing that he discovers the 
defect at a point of time, where a possible prevention is not feasible. In the 
context of the security regime, the professional judgment of the SSO and 
possibly the CSO with respect to minor defects is relevant in this regard. 
Undoubtedly, the issue of reporting defects and the assessment of their severity 
to the senior management as well as to RSOs is to be under scrutiny in this 
situation. 
• Since the ISPS Code was designed in the first place to counter terrorist attacks 
pertaining to the maritime field, the insurance market approach is focused on 
the terrorist aspect of the ISPS code, whereas the seaworthiness element, which 
can prevent to a great extent the occurrence of these attacks, is reflected 
through the ISSC, which from an insurance point of view is prima facie 
evidence of seaworthiness. In this regard, the War Risks Clauses are integrated 
in such an approach.  
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